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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Pitfalls of Defense Contracting 
Defense is the biggest and most costly business on earth. Global out-
lays for national security now exceed the total income of all the world's under-
developed nations. 
Humanity spends between $100 - $120 billion annually. In the U.S., 
expenditures for defense total about $50 billion a year, nearly 10% of the Gross 
National Product. 1 
The defense business grips entire industries and geographical areas. 
Over 90% of the U.S. aircraft and ordnance business is the result of Defense 
Department contracts. More than 25% of all industrial workers in Washington, 
Kansas and Alaska depend on defense projects for their livelihoods. 2 
Sales of even the largest companies, are to a substantial degree, for 
government end use as the following figures testify: RCA, 35%; Westinghouse, 
20%; G.E., 25%; IT&T, 60%; McDonnell Aircraft, 99%; Raytheon, 86%; General 
Dynamics, 95%; North American Aviation, 90%. 3 
Over the past fifteen years, many companies have been drawn to the 
defense market because of its dynamic growth and the rapid advances in tech-
nology. For example, the aerospace industry increased its capital400% and 
111$100 Billion Burden of World Defense", News Front, September, 
1963, p. 32. 
2Ibid. 
311Government Restraints", Harvard Business Review, May -June, 
1964, p. 53. 
1 
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its professional employment by more than 150%. The industry's ratio of 
technical employment to total employment is higher than in any other industry. 4 
Now, however, defense contractors have entered a more difficult period. 
Defense spending has leveled off, procurement standards have been tightened 
and competition has intensified. The immediate outlook for many smaller firms 
has become somewhat uncertain. The market is no longer a growth market. 
According to projections. within the next five years the production portion of 
the defense budget available to the aerospace industry will decline about 30%. 
and defense Research. Development. Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) will decline 
5 
about 15%. 
The most pressing problems of companies is that they are custom job 
shops with larger but significantly fewer major contracts on which to bid. Even 
the largest firms have found that obtaining business from the government is not 
as easy as it was. Under Secretary McNamara. the Pentagon is driving a 
harder bargain. Its stringent procurement regulations are aimed at getting 
the maximum value for each dollar expended. New incentive-type contracts 
are intended to reward the efficient producer. but to date the effect has been 
mainly a tighter squeeze on profit margins in an industry already plagued by 
low returns. Profits only average 1 1/2 - 2% after taxes on each dollar of 
business. compared with a 4. 5% average return for all manufacturing fields. 6 
In view of the declining market and fewer opportunities within the mar-
ket. the principal objective within the next few years should be to achieve 
stability. There are various strategies under considerations. some of which are: 
4 Thomas G. Miller. Jr .• "Strategies for Survival in the Aerospace 
IndustrY''. 128 World. Jan. 2 o. 1965, p. 5. 
5Ibid. 
6
"The Business of Defense. Financial World, August 7. 1963, p. 15. 
3 
diversification into other sectors of the market; diversification into non-defense 
products; and adaptation to a broader research and development base rather 
than to a predominantly production base. Complimentary steps to this latter 
strategy would involve specialization in a relatively few technical areas or pro-
duct lines. 
B. Scope and Organization of the St~y 
The purpose of this study of Defense Contracting is to perform a critical 
analysis of the relationship between the government and the defense contractor. 
The study will concentrate on the complex government procurement process and 
the numerous policy changes which are being instituted at the present time. 
Additionally, the study includes an examination of the overall impact of defense 
cuts and the possible solutions available to defense contractors who are adversely 
affected. 
Chapters II and III deal with the structure within which the defense con-
tracting process takes place; the nature of the government agencies and regula-
tions. and the characteristics of the industry supplying defense goods. 
Chapter IV covers the detail process of defense procurement. The or-
ganization of this chapter corresponds roughly to the chronological sequence 
of events in a defense program, considering bidding for a government contract, 
the negotiation of the contract, and the contractor's performance once the 
contract is underway. The chapter contains an analysis of the major controls 
imposed upon the contractor by the Defense Department, and the rights of the 
contractor to utilize the services of the Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals (ASBCA) when disputes arise. 
In Chapter V an attempt is made to forecast the future of defense 
spending. Chapter VI is a summary of the study. It contains recommended 
solutions for companies faced with large resources of technical talent and a 
declining market. 
CHAPTER IT 
EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 
A. Early Procurement Statutes 
In 1792 the Department of the Treasury was given the responsibility 
for purchases and contracts for the Army. In 1798, a separate Department 
of the Navy was established. During the same year, Congress declared that 
all purchases and contracts for supplies or services for the military and naval 
service would be made under the direction of the Department of War and Navy. 
Considering the historic interest of Congress in profits of c ootractors, it is 
interesting to note that the first procurement problems and abuses arose out 
of the activities of Congressmen in securing government contracts for friends 
and firms with which they were associated. In 1808 a law was passed re-
quiring the insertion of a clause in every government contract that no member 
of Congress might benefit therefrom. This prohibition is still present and is 
included in all government contracts as the "Officials Not to Benefit" clause. 
In 1809, Congress established a general requirement that formal ad-
vertising be used in the procurement of supplies and services. Other Acts 
passed in 1842 and 1843 extended the requirement for formal advertising. 
They required the use of sealed proposals, public bid openings and satisfactory 
security for performance requiring forfeiture not exceeding twice the contract 
amount. 
The Civil Sundry Appropriations Act of March 2, 1861, was the funda-
mental procurement regulation under which the Civil War was fought. The 
usual problems arose early in the war over the use of formal procurement 
procedures and the exceptions to its use led to recriminations with regard to 
war profiteering and excessive profits both during and after the war. Both the 
4 
5 
North and the South were plagued with profiteering by war contractors and 
several scandals early in the war caused shake-ups in the administration in 
1 
the North. 
Upon revision and amendment in 1874 and 1878, the Civil Sundry 
Appropriations Act became known as the Revised Statute 3709. In 1910, 
this Act was again revised re-emphasizing formal advertising as the required 
method of procurement. This Act was to be the standard regulation governing 
defense contracting until it was replaced by the Armed Services Procurement 
Act in 1947. 
B. W. W. II Procurement Policies 
During the period between World Wars I and II, there was considerable 
discussion about the failure of formal advertising procedures as a method of 
procurement in time of war. Also, the disgraceful bidding between the Ser-
vices for the available facilities and supplies led to the obvious conclusion 
that some centralized direction of procurement practices was necessary. As 
a result, Congress passed a series of laws which gradually eased the restric-
tions of R S 3709. 
Each of these acts provided for a prohibition against the use of a cost 
plus percentage of cost contracts. Where cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts were 
permitted the fees were generally limited to a maximum of 6 or 7% of the 
estimated cost. Even though Congress reluctantly granted exceptions to the 
use of formal advertising procedures, it continually reminded the Departments 
that this was the preferred method of purchasing. The War and Navy Depart-
ments which vividly remembered the criticisms stemming from World War I 
procurement practices which came to fruition in the Thirties were reluctant 
to abandon the bidding practices since its very formality gave protection 
from later criticism. 
1Paul R. McDonald, Government Prime Contracts and Subcontracts 
(Glendora, California: Procurement Associates, 1964), p. A-1-1. 
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At the outbreak of World War TI, therefore, the Services were still 
hamstrung in their procurement activities by the rigid R S 3709. After the 
commencement of the war in Eruope, Congress gradually eased the require-
ments with regard to the use of competitive bidding. After Pearl Harbor the 
requirement for competitive bidding was abolished and all procurement was 
handled by means of negotiation. Congress provided five mandatory powers 
to enforce procurement regulations; however, this policy was to use these 
only in emergency and main reliance was placed on persuasion and prime in-
ducements supported by the use of priorities and allocations to encourage in-
dividual firms to support the war effort. At the conclusion of the war, mass 
terminations took place. The Contract Settlement Act of 1944 provided a 
reasonably rapid method of settling claims and the reconversion to peace pro-
duction took place rapidly enough to absorb defense workers and millions of 
service personnel. 
C. The Armed Services Procurement Act (1947) 
Since the majority of the laws and orders passed or issued during 
World War IT were temporary in nature, the end of the war necessitated the 
return to the provisions of the Revised Statute.3709 with its emphasis on com-
petitive bidding. The war, however, had demonstrated the inefficiency of com-
petitive bidding in times of national emergency. The services and industry 
had shown that negotiation could be used in awarding contracts. It was realized 
that return to the inflexible procedures of formal advertising would mean that 
supplying the needs of the military would soon revert to a relatively small 
group of professional government suppliers with the consequent loss of in-
valuable defense know-how acquired by industry during the war years. 
The Procurement Policy Board, in November, 1945, recommended 
that the Government agencies propose legislation to take effect when the 
emergency procure:rre nt legislation expired. They recommended that the 
proposed legislation recognize that formal advertising is the preferred method 
7 
of procurement but provision should be made for broad authority to negotiate 
price and other contract terms when circumstances required it, and to dispense 
with formal advertising completely during any future national emergency. In 
accordance with these recommendations, a bill was prepared and introduced 
in the 80th Congress on January 7, 1947 as H. R. 1366, the Armed Services 
Procurement Bill. This bill pulled together in one statute all Department 
of Defense procurement authority and replaced all of the former laws in the 
process. The bill became effective on May 19, 1948 and it unified the Army, 
Navy and Air Force procurement authority under one statute. 
The Armed Services Procurement Act states that a formal advertising 
method is the preferred method of procurement. However, it authorizes 
negotiated purchases where circumstances require or justify a departure from 
formal advertising. The act provides for the use of the type of contract best 
adapted for the circumstances. It permits the making of advance payments, 
authorizes the Comptroller General to remit liquidated damages which may be 
accrued from a contractor's delay and provides statuatory authorization for 
joint procurement between the services. The Act specifically sets forth 17 
2 
exceptions to the requirement for procurement by formal advertising. 
D. Centralization Under the Department of Defense 
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 was clarified by Con-
gress in 1949 to vest centralized authority in the Secretary of Defense by 
taking from the services their status as separate executive departments, by 
creating the Department of Defense (to replace the National Defense Establish-
ment) as an executive department with "direction, authority and control" over 
the services, and by a number of small but none-the-less significant language change. 3 
2A list of these exceptions may be found in Appendix A. 
3Public Law 216, 81st Congress (63 Stat. 578), 1949. 
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This centralization was affirmed in 1953 when counsel to the President's 
Committee on Department of Defense Organization concluded that "the power 
and authority of the Secretary of Defense is complete and supreme". 4 
Numerous manifestations of the Defense Secretary's growing authority 
can be found. One was the appointment in 1950 of a Director of Guided Missiles -
the first Department of Defense guided missile "czar" -to assume broad re-
sponsibilities over guided missile development and production in all three 
services. Another was the abolishment in 1953 of the Munitions Board and 
the Research and Development Board and the transfer of their functions to new 
assistant secretaries of defense for Supply and Logistics and for Research and 
Development. 
Even though considerable responsibility for defense spending remains 
decentralized in practice with the individual services, the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense has since 1949 exercised an increasingly strong role in determining 
what weapons should be developed and procured, in allocating resources to 
weapons programs; in coordinating research, development, and production 
activities; in establishing procurement policy (through the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulation); and in reviewing practice to ensure adherence to policies. 
Still another indication of an increasing centralization of U.S. defense 
spending was the creation in 1958 of the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA). which for the first time involved the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
directly in the actual implementation of prospective weapons programs. This 
civilian-directed agency was established to sponsor advanced work on projects 
for which ultimate service operational assignments were not yet assigned. 
E. Who is the Buyer? 
There are numerous government agencies responsible for buying de-
fense items: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the three services, multiple 
4Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organiza-
tion, Appendix A, April 1953, as published in the Senate, 2nd Sess. (1956), p. 62. 
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bureaus and commands within the services, and independent agencies outside 
the services. It is not appropriate to consider the government as a single 
buyer. Although a single buyer in the sense of ultimate integration at the 
presidential level, the government is in practice many different and discordant 
buyers. The multibuyer nature of the government is seen by considering the 
frequent conflicts which arise between agencies in deciding what and how much 
to buy. 
At the highest levels, there is a perennial conflict between the services, 
the Secretary of Defense, and the President (as represented by the Budget Bureau) 
over budgets -in other words, over row much to buy. The services have con-
sistently wanted to spend more than higher authorities have been willing to make 
available to them. In recent years, too. the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
has become increasingly active in overturning service decisions on specific 
programs, i.e,. on what to buy. Figure 1 is an organization chart of the De-
partment of Defense. 
To understand the government's behavior in its role as buyer, it is 
necessary to consider briefly a few additional characteristics. 
The U.S. defense establishment is extremely large. In 1960 the Depart-
ment of Defense and the three services employed 1, 032, 000 civilians as well 
as 2, 476, 000 military personnel. By way of comparison, the entire Bell System 
(including Western Electric) employed 735, 800, while General Motors listed 
595, 200 employees in that year. 5 
Elaborate and often rigid bureaucratic procedures follow almost auto-
matically from the defense establishment's ponderous size. A fairly routine 
contract authorization may require upwards of 50 written concurrences or 
5Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition 
Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University, 1962), p. 85. 
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approvals, while the decision to begin a new weapons program formally in-
volves hundreds of organizational groups and individuals. 
Another feature of the U.S. Government is the maintenance of a system 
to ensure strict public accountability of executive agencies and officials. Each 
of the services and each major command maintains an Inspector General with 
a staff. Audit of government operations is also performed by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) and a host of congressional committees. It is generally 
believed that the threat of GAO investigation tends to introduce a conservative, 
"play it safe" bias into the discharge of government duties. 
F. McNamara Era 
The appointment of Robert S. McNamara, in 1960, to the pos~ of Secre-
tary of Defense took the country by surprise. Most people in Washington had 
never heard of him. Within a couple of years, he was under sharp attack 
for exercising too much control at the Pentagon. He was accused of forcing the 
armed services to "speak with one voice"; of establishing super agencies to 
take over functions that had been handled separately by the individual military 
services; of overriding the voice of professional experience; however, the 
irrefutable facts were that he was developing a more efficient machine and was 
apparently saving millions of dollars in defense spending. 6 
What irritated many of the military men at the Pentagon under McNamara 
was the implication that computer calculations, operational analysis and abstract 
theories somehow lend greater weight into the decision-making process than the 
voices of experience. The picture of young smart-alecks invading the precincts of 
military responsibility was drawn by Retired Air Force Chief of Staff General 
Thomas D. White, when he said that, "in common with other military men I 
am profoundly apprehensive of pipe-smoking. trees-full-of-owls type of so-
called defense intellectuals who have been brought into this nation's capitol". 7 
6 Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1964), p. 282. 
7 General Thomas D. White, Newsweek, June, 1963. 
12 
The resistance to Secretary McNamara has been ineffectual. Even 
General Curtis E. LeMay, an early antagonist, faded into silence when he 
was reappointed Air Force Chief of Staff in 1963 for a single year instead of 
the customary two. 
In 1961, Secretary McNamara adopted a system of functional budgeting 
for defense that virtually ignored the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines in 
fiscal terms, but provided for support of these forces on the basis of their 
missions. The new regime had a budgeting technique that had these objectives: 
to provide policy-makers with a means of looking at total cost in money and 
man-hours for any given weapons programs; to provide a "cost-efficiency" 
ratio for these programs so that policy-makers can decide whether the extra 
benefits they expect are worth the input when compared with other means of 
accomplishing the same mission; to project for five-year periods the cost 
estimates of related military programs; to assess military power and the costs 
of military power by grouping technical tactical and strategic forces regardless 
of the particular military service that provide them. 8 
In short, the budget is the principal management tool in the Defense 
Department, In fiscal 1964, Secretary McNamara managed a total budget in 
the order of $50 billion, more than one half the total federal budget. 
8 Raymond, op. cit., p. 302. 
CHAPTER III 
PROF1LE OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
A. The Top 100 Prime Contractors 
The award of military prime contracts has always been concentrated in 
a few companies. In World War II the 100 largest contractors ranked by dollar 
volume of contract awards accounted for 67.2% of the value of all military con-
tracts and among these the top 25 companies has 46. 5%. 1 
During the Korean action this pattern was repeated with the top 100 
accounting for 64% and the top 25 for 45.5% of all contract dollars. By the 
period fiscal years 1958 - 1963, however, there was a significant increase in 
concentration; the top 100 with 73. 5% and the top 25 with 55. 3%. 2 
The defense industry is a blend of a relatively small number of large 
contractors and a large numrer of relatively small hardware suppliers. About 
one-half of the work received by the top 100 contractors is sub-contracted down 
to the smaller companies. 
A major difference among companies high on the contracting list lies 
in their relative dependence on defense work for profits. Some of them, such 
as AT&T, G.E., General Motors, and Ford, derive only a minor share of annual 
profits from sales to the Defense Department, while other leading companies 
such as Boeing, General Dynamics, Republic, Avco, Raytheon, McDonnell, 
Hughes, and Northrop rely primarily on the Defense Department. 
Table 1 reflects the 100 largest Defense Department Prime Contractors 
for the fiscal year 1963. It is of interest to compare the membership of a list 
1 Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition 
Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University, 1962), p. 117. 
2Ibid. 
13 
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Table 1 
The 100 Largest Defense Department Prime Contractors 
Rank $ Rank $ 
1963 Company Millions 1963 Company Millions 
1 Lockheed 1517 40 Genl. Precision 131 
2 Boeing 1357 41 Texaco 121 
3 No. Amer. Av. 1062 42 Std. Oil Calif. 117 
4 Genl. Dynamics 1033 43 Thompsn-Ramo 106 
5 Genl. Elec. 1021 44 Curtiss-Wrgt. 98 
6 Martin 767 45 Conti. Motors 97 
7 AT&T 579 46 Morrison -Kund 84 
8 United Arcft. 530 47 Studebaker 83 
9 McDonnl. Airc. 497 48 Burroughs 78 
10 Sperry Rand 446 49 Aerospace 76 
11 Genl. Motors 444 50 Goodyear 73 
12 Genl. Tire RB 425 51 Mass. Inst. Tech. 71 
13 Grumman Airc. 391 52 Bethlehm. Stl. 68 
14 Douglas Airc. 361 53 Hays Intl. 67 
15 RCA 329 54 Shell 67 
16 Westghse. Elec. 323 55 Intl. Harvester 66 
17 Hughes Aircf. 313 56 Olin Mathsn. 66 
18 Raytheon 295 57 Johns Hopkns. 66 
19 Bendix 290 58 Socong Mobil 64 
20 Intl. Tel. & Tel. 266 59 Lear -Siegler 61 
21 Avco 253 60 Magna vox 58 
22 Thiokol Chern. 239 61 Amer. Mch. Fd. 57 
23 Ford Motor 228 62 Universal AM 56 
24 Northrop 223 63 Garrett 56 
25 Newsport News 221 64 Kiewit Peter 54 
26 Ling-Temco 206 65 Kaiser Inds. 49 
27 I.B.M. 203 66 Dupont 48 
28 F. M. C. Corp. 199 67 Std. Oil Ind. 46 
29 Litton Inds. 198 68 Kaman Aircraft 45 
30 Republic Av. 197 69 Ryan Aeront. 44 
31 Chrysler 186 70 White Motor 44 
32 Hercules Power 183 71 System Dev. 44 
33 Minn. - Honeywell 170 72 Conti. Oil 43 
34 Merritt-Chap. 170 73 Syrdrup & Par. 42 
35 Genl. Tel. & Elec. 163 74 Western Union 42 
36 Std. Oil N.J. 156 75 Richfield Oil 40 
37 Pan. Amer. 155 76 Sinclair Oil 38 
38 Textron 151 77 Vitro Corp. 37 
39 Collins Radio 144 78 Gilfillan 37 
15 
Table 1 (Cont). 
Rank $ 
1963 Company Millions 
79 Eastman Kodak 37 
80 Bath Iron 35 
81 Amer. Bosch 34 
82 Union Carbd. 34 
83 Day & Zimmerman 33 
84 Mitre Corp. 33 
85 Asiatic Pet. 33 
86 Allis -C hlmrs. 31 
87 Sundstrand 31 
88 Control Data 30 
89 Hazeltine 30 
90 Dynalectron 30 
91 Defoe 29 
92 Flying Tiger 29 
93 Lora! Elec. 29 
94 Texas Instru. 29 
95 Air Prdts. Chml. 28 
96 Atkinson 27 
97 Carrier 27 
98 Clark Equip. 27 
99 U.S. Lines 27 
100 Phillips Petl. 27 
Source: "Defense Contractors", News Front, Vol. VII, (Decerri>er/January, 
1964), p. 20. 
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of the 100 largest defense contractors with the membership of a list of the 
100 largest industrial firms in the economy as measured by their sales. 
Forty of the firms appear on both lists. The appearance of the same names 
of ~oth lists indicates either that their defense business alone makes some 
firms large enough so that they are counted among the largest industrial 
corporations, or that corporations, large from their commercial business, 
have entered into defense work. In either case, the overlap is influenced 
by the fact that the increased complexity of weapons system production re-
quires large firms to take the responsibility of doing the work. 
B. Products, Company Sizes and Locations 
Although the defense industry in total has not performed spectacularly 
relative to the economy, certain segments have benefited at the expense of 
others. Table 2 lists all prime contract awards for major hard goods made 
to businesses for work in the United States by major procurement program 
for the fiscal years 1955 - 1962. As would be expected, the major gains were 
in missile systems, which increased from $800 million, to almost $6.7 billion 
in the eight-year period. Other major growth areas were electronic and communi-
cation systems, and ships. 
Up to this point we have considered only the prime contractors, those 
firms holding contracts with the government. The prime contractors, like 
any other business, utilize part of their receipts to buy goods and services 
from other firms. The latter may be classified as "medium-sized" and "small 
business" firms. They receive approximately 45 - 50% of the receipts paid to 
large defense contractors by the government. Generally, these "medium-sized" 
and "small business" firms receive a relatively minor share of prime contractor 
dollars, since technically advanced weapons constitute the substantial propor-
tion of prime contract awards. They usually are limited to providing major 
subsystems, materials and components, textiles, food and the like. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Prime Contract Awards by Procurement Programs 
(millions of dollars) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Aircraft 5,424 5, 780 5,019 7,416 6, 487 4,788 4, 936 5, 104 
Missile Systems 802 1, 002 1, 864 2, 837 4, 490 4, 984 5, 884 6, 690 
Ships 552 790 927 650 1,095 1, 010 1, 336 1,475 
Tanks-Automotive 434 375 364 495 350 404 579 1, 004 
Weapons 331 209 274 212 187 121 143 220 
Ammunition 735 378 434 298 356 476 552 921 
E lee tronic s 1, 144 1, 589 1, 889 1, 987 2z474 3, 026 3, 154 3, 306 
Major Hard Goods 9,422 10,124 10,771 13, 896 15, 440 14, 808 16, 613 18, 760 
NOTE: May not add due to rounding 
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., How Sick is the Defense Industry?, 4th edition 
(September 10, 1963), p. 12. 
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The changes in the product mix of the defense industry, viz., the rise 
of missiles and electronics and the decline of ordnance and aircraft have had 
their geographic consequences. In World War II the distribution of defense 
contracts more or less followed the existing pattern of manufacturing and the 
major industrial states - Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana - ranked 
high in contract awards. Korea marked the beginning of the change, for the 
old-line manufacturing states began to decline in relative position. California 
displaced New York as number one and Texas appeared in place of Indiana. 
By 1960 the dominance of California was even more marked. Texas and 
Massachusetts have moved markedly up the list and Washington appears 
among the top ten for the first time. Table 3 delineates the geographic dis-
tribution of defense contracts from 1945 - 1960. California continued to lead 
the nation in defense contracts in the first quarter of fiscal 1965. In the July -
September quarter this year, California was awarded 21.2% of the total DOD 
procurement contracts for a total of $10.2 billion. 3 
C. Effect on the Civilian Economy 
The multi-billion dollar defense industry has an impact on the stability 
of the economy of which it is such a substantial part. The geographical loca-
tion of the industry is diffused throughout the country. There are few congressional 
districts without several local firms dependent upon defense contracts for their 
survival. 
In terms of direct economic consequences, however, the geographic 
concentration of defense spending is probably more important than its dispersion. 
Table 3 indicated that California receives more than 20% of prime contract 
awards. The California firms are concentrated primarily in the Los Angeles -
San Diego area, with a secondary and newer cluster in the San Francisco Bay area. 
3Electronic News, "California Keeps DOD Contracts"; Dec. 7, 1964, 
p. 20. 
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Table 3 
Geographic Distribution of Defense Contracts: Three Periods 
W. W. II Contracts Korean Contracts Missile Age Contracts 
(to June, 1945) (July, 1950 - (1959 - 1960) 
Dec., 1956) 
%of Total %of Total %of Total 
Contract Contract Contract 
State Position Awards Position Awards Position Awards 
New York 1 11. O% 2 14.6% 2 11.4% 
Michigan 2 10.9 3 6.4 9 3.3 
California 3 8.7 1 16.4 1 24.0 
Ohio 4 8.4 4 6.1 6 4.4 
N.J. 5 6.8 5 5.3 5 5.0 
Penn. 6 6.6 7 4.3 10 3.2 
Ill. 7 6.1 6 4.8 14 2.1 
Indiana 8 4.5 >::: ,,_ 16 1.7 .,, 
Conn. 9 4.1 ::::: ::::: 7 4.2 
Mass. 10 3.4 9 2.7 4 5.3 
Texas 11 3.1 8 3.8 3 5.8 
Wash. 14 2.3 >:c -·- 8 4.0 .,, 
Missouri 15 1, 8 10 2.3 13 2.2 
1st 10 - % of total 70.5% 65.7% 70.6% 
>:<Not among the top 10. 
Sources: World War II:, War Production Board, Summary of War Supply and 
Facility Contracts by State (Nov. 1, 1945), Table 1. 
Korea: Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Military 
Procurement, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), p. 322. 
Missile Age: Department of Defense, Statistical Abstract 1961, 
p. 238. 
20 
The three defense industries - aircraft, electronics, and ordnance - account 
for 39% of the manufacturing employment in the Los Angeles area. 4 Add to 
this the firms in other industries supplying these three defense industries as 
well as the proportion of consumer goods and services bought by defense 
workers and the result is what has been termed, "Southern California's Pre-
carious One-Crop Economy". 5 What this means concretely is apparent from 
a study by the Southern California Research Council. The Council concludes 
that: 
If a 50% cut in defense expenditures should occur while 
business conditions and investment remain high, the 
estimate would be for total unemployment of about 
200, 000 persons or 12% of the Los Angeles area's 
labor force. If business conditions or investments 
are lower, unemployment might approximate 350, 000 
or 20%. 6 
Other metropolitan areas are in a similar position. This situation 
stems from the need of industry to have access to persons with advap.ced train-
ing who can translate the new science into vastly improved of wholly new pro-
ducts. 
The government has undertaken certain measures to ameliorate the pro-
curement shifts. Intensive studies have been initiated by several government 
agencies to study long-range military buying needs. Chapter 6 contains an 
analysis of the results of these studies. 
4Maurice J. Gershenson, "Shifts in California's Industrial and Employment 
Composition", Monthly Labor Review, May 1959, p. 513. 
5Seyom Brown, "Southern California's Precarious One-Crop Economy", 
The Reporter, Jan. 7, 1960, p. 25. 
6This study is entitled, "The Effects of a Reduction of Defense Expendi-
tures Upon the L. A. Area". Ibid., p. 26. 
CHAPTER IV 
WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND INDUSTRY 
A. Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) 
During the past ten years the level of defense expenditures in the 
United States has increased enormously. In the same period, for the first 
time, a permanent industry has developed in this country. Many unique pro-
blems have arisen. A complex and voluminous set of regulations has been 
developed to solve or minimize these problems. This instrument, through 
which DOD strives to achieve all its goals, is called the "Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations" (ASPR). The ASPR contains seventeen sections and 
five appendices contained in a volume some three inches thick. 
Because of the importance of ASPR to defense contractors, its bulk, the 
numerous changes, and the dreary reading, this thesis will touch only on the 
major provisions, particularly where divergencies between the wording and 
spirit of ASPR and their practical applications in the field occur. 
Table 4 lists the sections headings contained in ASPR. The most sig-
nificant sections for a general discussion of the defense business relate to the 
use and definition of contract type, pricing policies, and cost principles. 
The ASPR is continually being revised by the many committees assigned 
to review portions of it. Where revisions are substantial they are usually coor-
dinated with industry. In some cases where there is a basic conflict between 
the interests of the government and the interests of the defense industry, 
"coordination" may lead to heated debate. Recent examples of this were the 
revisions of the ASPR sections concerned with cost principles and proprietary 
data. 
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Table 4 
Armed Services Procurement Regulations -- Section Titles 
I General Provisions 
II Procurement by Formal Advertising 
ill Procurement by Negotiation 
IV Special Types and Methods of Procurement 
V Interdepartmental and Coordinated Procurement 
VI Foreign Purchases 
VII Contract Clauses 
VIII Termination of Contracts 
IX Patents, Data, and Copyrights 
X Bonds and Insurance 
XI Federal, State, and Local Taxes 
XII Labor 
XTII Government Property 
XIV Inspection and Acceptance 
XV Contract Cost Principles and Procedures 
XVI Procurement Forms 
XVII Extraordinary Contractual Actions to Facilitate the National Defense 
Appendix 
A Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals 
B Manual for Control of Government Property in Possession of Contractors 
C Manual for Control of Government Property in Possession of Non-
Profit Research and Development Contractors 
D Rules for Notice and Hearing Under Gratuities Clause in Armed 
Services Procurement Regulation 7-104. 16 
E Defense Contract Financing Regulations 
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., How Sick is the Defense Industry?, 4th edition 
(September 10, 1963), p. 29. 
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B. Procurement by Advertising and Negotiation 
The long history of emphasis by the Congress on the use of competitive 
bidding and formal advertising procedures for the purchase of supplies and ser-
vices has been discussed in Chapter I. The Armed Services Procurement Act 
of 1947 emphasized that procurement by formal advertising is the preferred 
method of purchasing for all government agencies. There are many exceptions 
to this policy, however. In 1962, for example, 86. 9% of all procurement was 
awarded without advertising. Secretary McNamara is making a concerted 
effort to reduce this figure drastically. 
Contracts let after formal advertising are normally firm-fixed price, 
except that fixed-price with escalation may be used where some flexibility is 
necessary and feasible. Contracts for supplies and services may be negotiated 
under no less than 18 exceptions to the policy that all contracts must be based 
on advertised bids. The exceptions most significant to business are contracts 
for "experimental, developmental or research work" and "technical or specialized 
supplies" requiring substantial initial investment or extended period of prepara-
tion for manufacture. Before negotiation, policy demands that quotations, 
sufficiently supported by cost data, be solicited from the maximum number of 
qualified sources consistent with the nature of the supplies or services to be 
procured. Negotiations are conducted by the contracting officer, who is supposed 
to bear in mind some 21 factors ranging from price, quality, and delivery to 
dispersal of the contractor sites and the location of labor surplus areas. 
The pros and cons of formal advertising have been debated since the 
early days of the country's founding. Congress has consistently advocated for-
mal advertising. Some contractors, particularly those who depend on "proprietary" 
items for the bulk of their business, object violently to the use of competitive 
bidding. Where the criteria for the use of formal advertising are present, it 
has consistently resulted in substantial savings to the government. 
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C. Bidding Practices 
1. Squeeze on Bidding Expenses 
The importance of bidding in the defense business can not be overem-
phasized. It is a tool by which the defense contractor secures the contracts 
without which he would not be able to continue his business. 
In some cases, the question as to who will be asked to bid on a pro-
posal is left up to the government contracting office. In other cases, the 
initiating technical section of a government agency will specify either a single 
contractor, or it may recommend to the contracting office a number of companies 
to be solicited. If the procurement is not restricted to a sole source, the con-
tracting office selects a number of qualified companies from a bidder's list. 
The list of potential suppliers selected from the source files is screened to 
select only eligible contractors by screening them against a Debarred and In-
eligible Bidder's List. The regulations do not require that all qualified bidders 
re<?eive a chance to bid on the "Invitation For Bid" or receive a copy of the 
"Request For Proposal", but require a sufficient number be solicited to pro-
vide competition for the procurement. In very large and complex procurement, 
in order to save time, a bidder's conference may be called to which are invited 
those firms whom the service feels might be interested in the particular pro-
curement. Any other firm which meets the basic security requirement may 
also attend. 
Once in a position to submit a bid, the contractor is usually faced with 
stiff competition because the cutback in defense spending has created a highly 
competitive situation, and the Department of Defense is taking full advantage 
of the current ''buyers" market. Anywhere from a dozen to twenty or thirty 
companies are maneuvering hungrily against one another for a handful of 
possible large systems contracts that dimly persist on the federal horizon. 
A company fortunate enough to land one of these big jobs could count on re-
maining an elite research and production establishment for quite a few years 
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to come. The companies that lose out are the ones that will be early candi-
dates for merger, consolidation, even extinction. 
Unfortunately, it is quite expensive for a company to even bid on large 
government contracts. Most companies are forced to establish elaborate 
systems to determine the governments needs and prepare for the day when 
a bid proposal will be submitted. Millions of dollars are spent by companies on 
single proposals only to be wasted when a competitor wins a contract because 
of a lower price or a superior technical approach. Eighteen per cent (18%) 
of the aerospace industry's top scientific and engineering talent is working on 
proposals of which seventy-five per cent (75%) will be unsuccessful. 1 
2. Review .and Evaluation of Proposals 
Many firms are surprised at the sophistication and complexity of the 
evaluation techniques used by major government procuring agencies. 
In the selection of a contractor to perform research and development, 
considerable judgment must be exercised by the contracting officer. ASPR 
3-805. 1(d) states: 
Award of a contract may be properly influenced by the 
proposal which promises the greatest value to the Govern-
ment in terms of possible performance, ultimate pro-
ducibility, growth potential, and other factors rather 
than the proposal offering the lowest price or probable 
cost and fixed fee. 
However, the contracting officer in making his selection of a contractor 
to whom to award a research and development contract cannot disregard cost 
completely. Since ASPR 4-204. 5 states: 
While cost or price should not be the controlling factor 
in choosing a Contractor for a research and development 
contract, cost or price should not be disregarded in the 
111The Business of Defense," Financial World, Aug. 7, 1963, p. 27. 
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choice of a Contractor. It is important to determine 
the soundness of a proposed cost or price estimate, not 
only to determine whether the estimate is reasonable, 
but also to determine the contractor's understanding of 
the project and ability to organize and perform the con-
tract. 
Before determining the technical competence of prospective contrac-
tors, the government personnel consider the following: 
(a) The contractor's understanding of the scope of work as shown 
by the scientific or technical approach proposed. 
(b) Availability and competence of experienced engineering, scientific, 
or other technical personnel. 
(c) Availability, from any source, of necessary research, test, and 
production facilities. 
(d) Experience or pertinent novel ideas in the specific branch of 
science or technology involved. 
Of course, in determining to whom the contract should be awarded, the 
contracting officer must consider not only price and technical competence, but 
also all other pertinent factors including management capabilities, weighing 
each factor in accordance with the requirements of a particular procurement. 
Many times the technical proposals will be screened against a check 
list containing numerous factors. Numerical weights are assigned to these 
factors depending upon their relative importance. The final weighted average 
is computed and the best technical proposal is the one which has the highest 
weighted average. An example of this numerical weighting system is shown 
in Table 5. 
Usually, the government procuring agencies establish their own esti-
mate of a fair and reasonable cost, and it is used as a basis of evaluation for 
all proposed costs. The problem of selecting a contractor then becomes one 
of finding the best technical proposal that comes reasonably close to the 
Table 5 
Proposal Evaluation 
--
EVAL!IATIO~ FACTORS WT. 
PART I. GEXERAL Qt:ALITY A:-:'D RESPONSIYE~ESS OF PROPOSAL 
a. CO~tPLETEliESS AXD THOROL"GHXESS 5 
--
b. GRASP OF PROBLEM 10 
c. RESPOXSIVEXESS TO TER~IS, CO~ITIONS AND 
Tt:\!E OF PERFOR;\!Al<CE 3 
d. WEIGIITED TOTAL (18) 
e. WEIGIITED AVERAGE 
PART 1!. ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL, AND FACILITIES 
a. EVIDENCE OF GOOD ORGANIZATION AND 
l\L\l<AGEl\IENT PRACTICES 5 
b. Q!IALIFICATIOXS OF PERSON"SEL 10 
c. ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES 8 
d. EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR OR RELATED FIELDS 5 
e. RECORD OF PAST PERFORMANCE 5 
(. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 5 
g. WEIGIITED TOTAL (38) 
h. WEIGIITED AVERAGE 
PART Ul. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
a. RELIABILITY 10 
b. !ltAI~TAINABILITY 5 
c. PRODL"C!BILITY A:\0 ECO~OMY 5 
d. TECHNICAL DATA A~ DOCUMENTATION 5 
e. OVERALL SIZE Al'm WEIGIIT 10 
r. POWER CO:-!St:l\IPT!ON 10 
g. E:-<VffiO:-Il\IENTAL RA)(GE 3 
h. St!IELDI=-G TECHNIQIJES 8 
i. WEIGHTED TOTAL (56) 
j. WEIGHTED AVERAGE 
PART IV. FLNAL TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
a. (I) GE:-o"ERAL QUALITY A)(D RESPONSfVENESS 
OF PROPOSAL 1 
b. (II) ORGA:-r!ZATION, PERSONNEL, A!>'D FACILITIES 2 
c. (Ill) TECHNICAL APPROACH 3 
d. WEIGHTED TOTAL (6) 
e. f1NAL WEIGIITED AVERAGE 
~--· 
-- - -- ---
*NOTE: WHERE FACTOR IS )(OT RATED FOR ANY REASON, WEIGIIT 
FOR TillS FACTOR IS NOT INCLUDED IN COMPUTDIG AVERAGE. 
PROPOSAL A PROPOSAL B 
80 X 5 = 400 50 X 5 = 250 
90 X 10 = 900 60 X 10 = 600 
95x 3=285 SOx 3•150 
1585 1000 
1~~5 = 88.0 1~~0 =55. 5 
80 X 5 = 400 60 X 5 = 300 
85 X 10 = 850 70 X 10 • 700 
70 X 8 = 560 SOx 8=400 
75 X 5 • 375 40x 5=200 
NOT RATED* NOT RATED* 
100 X 5 • 500 70 X 5 • 350 
2685 1950 
2685 ~-59 1 
-w·81.3 33• • 
70 X 10 • 700 70 X 10 • 700 
80" 5. 400 70 X 5 = 350 
85 X 5 • 425 70 X 5 = 350 
70" 5. 350 40 X 5 = 200 
85 X 10 = 850 50 X 10 • 500 
80 X 10 = 800 80 " 10 = 800 
85 X 3 • 255 70 X 3 • 210 
70 X 8 = 560 BOx 8=640 
4340 3750 
4~:0 z 77.5 3~~0 • 66.9 
88. 0 X 1 • 88. 0 55.5 X 1 • 55.5 
81.3 X 2 • 162. 6 59. 1 X. 2- 118. 2 
77. 5 " 3 • 232.5 66.9 X 3 z 200.7 
483. i 374.4 
~-so.s 6 ~-62.4 
PROPOSAL C PROPOSAL D 
70 X 5 = 350 90 X 5 = 450 
·-
70 X 10 • 700 95 X 10 = 950 
90 X 3 • 270 95 X 3 • 285 
1320 1685 
~= 73.3 18 
1~~5 • 93.5 
90 X 5 = 450 95 X 5 = 475 
95 X 10 = 950 95" 10 = 950 
95 X 8 = 760 95 X 8 = 760 
95 X 5 = 475 100 X 5 z 500 
80 X 5 = 400 90" 5 = 450 
70 X 5 = 350 80 X 5 = 400 
3385 3535 
3~~5 - 89.1 3~~5 • 93.0 
~5 X 10 • 650 95 X 10 • 950 
10 x s = 35u 90 X 5 • 450 
75 X 5. 375 90 X 5 • 450 
80 X 5 = 400 95 X 5 • 475 
70 X 10 = 700 90 X 10 = 900 
60 X 10 = 600 70 X 10" 700 
75 X 3 = 225 90 X 3 = 270 
70 X 8 = 560 80" 8 = 640 
3860 4835 
3~:0 = 68.9 4:!5 • 86.3 
73.3 X 1 = 73.3 93.5x1= 93.5 
89.1 X 2= 178.2 93. 0 X 2 = 186. 0 
66. 9 X 3 = 206. 7 86. 3 X 3 = 258. 9 
458.2 538.4 
45~.2= 76.4 53~. 4. 89.7 
Source: Government Prime Contracts, Procurement Associates, March, 1964, p. C-3-5. 
PROPOSAL E 
80l< 5=400 
95 X 10 = 950 
70 X 3 = 210 
1560 
1~0 = 86.6 
90 X 5 = 450 
9~ X 10 • 900 
90 X s- 720 
100" 5 = 500 
90 X 5 = 450 
SO X 5 = 400 
3420 
~~0 • 90.0 
95" 10. 9!0 
95 X 5 • 475 
95 X 5 = ~75 
90 X 5 = 450 
98 X 10 = 980 
92 X 10 = 9~0 
95 X 3 = 2:15 
90 X 8 = 720 
5255 
5~~5 = 93. 8 
86.6 X 1 = 86.6 
90. 0 X 2 = 180. 0 
93.8 X 3 = 281.4 
548.0 
¥=91.3 
PROPOSAL F 
---
1:..:> 
-.J 
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government's estimate of what the contract should cost. Since the government's 
estimate is refined as a result of preliminary review of all technical and cost 
proposals, there should be at least one acceptable proposal which will closely 
approach the government's estimate. 
Up to this point the discussion has been limited to the evaluation of re-
search and development proposal evaluations. A different approach is taken 
when the government is purchasing an item which can be adequately described 
in specifications, or when it is purchasing an item which is already developed. 
In these cases, the basic policy is to award the contract to the firm which will 
supply an acceptable item at the best possible price. In short, the contract 
will be awarded to the lowest bidder after formal advertising and without com-
plex negotiations. 
The government reasons that it does not make sense for them to finance 
poor management by allowing certain bidding expenses as legitimate costs. 
Mounting evidence indicates that DOD will put negotiated ceilings on the soaring 
costs of bidding. Although sound in principle, such action could choke the Re-
search & Development (R&D) that provides the ideas necessary for both growth 
and security. 
A number of committees have studied and restudied the problem. De-
spite some conflict on details, there are two areas of general agreement about 
what is going on and what will be done. Both will have a profound effect on the 
entire aerospace industry: 
(a) Bidding expense is integrated with the entire contractor inde-
pendent Research & Development (!R&D) program. The two 
will be considered together. 
(b) There will be a definite negotiated limit placed on these ex-
penses, as one part of allowable General & Administrative (G&A) 
2 
expense. 
2
"The Coming Squeeze on Bidding Expense," Aerospace Management, 
Feb., 1964, p. 50. 
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This action will have the effect of placing definite dollar limitation 
on reimbursable ex.r:enses for new business activity. Under the contemplated 
DOD costing scheme, IR&D and Bidding efforts will have to be provided for 
from the lump sum that will be part of reimbursable G&A. Any effort beyond 
that will have to come out of the company's profits. 
The prospect of funding new business penetration solely out of profits 
is singularly unattractive because profit dollars already are at an all-time 
low. In anticipation of operating under these new regulations it will pay defense 
contractors to re-examine past treatment of IR&D and Bidding efforts and see 
where economies can be made. 
D. Contract Negotiations 
ASPR 1-201. 11 states "Negotiate and negotiation, when applied to the 
making of purchases and contracts refer to making purchases and contracts 
without formal advertising." Negotiation is generally thought of in terms of 
the initial pricing and settlement of contract terms and conditions. Actually, 
negotiation encompasses many more areas. In addition to the basic problem 
of determining a fair and reasonable price, government contracts have many 
provisions which allow the contracting officer to make changes in the original 
terms and conditions of the contract which require negotiation of the equitable 
adjustments for such changes. In addition, negotiation is required in determining 
the interpretation and application of the contract terms and conditions. 
The following is a list of some of the important areas in which the 
contractor and government may negotiate with regard to contracts: 
(a) The price, terms and conditions of the original contract. 
(b) Adjustments with regard to the furnishing of Government Property. 
(c) Variations in quantity. 
(d) Determinations as to whether items meet the specifications and 
requirements of the contract. 
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(e) Price revision under redetermination, escalation and incentive 
provisions. 
(f) Problems in connection with the acceptability of individual items 
of <?OSt under cost type contracts. 
(g) Negotiations of overhead rates for cost type contracts. 
(h) Acceptability of accounting, inspection and purchasing systems. 
(i) The approval of make-of-buy programs and individual subcontracts. 
(j) Negotiation of problems with the patent and proprietary data pro-
visions of the contract. 
(k) Termination settlements and problems in connection with the 
disposal of property. 
The contractor, during the term of a government contract, may negotiate 
with the contracting officer and the cost analysts, legal and technical personnel 
who assist him. During the performance of the contract, the contractor may 
negotiate with auditors, inspectors, property administrators, security repre-
sentatives and others concerned with the performance and administration of 
the contract. 
1. Weighted Guidelines 
Because of the interest of Congress in the profits made by defense con-
tractors and the inability of the government to apply realistic cost and price 
analysis techniques to new complex items to determine the reasonableness of 
the contractors' estimated costs, more attention has been paid to the negotiation 
of profit and fee by the government than was called for by the amount of money 
involved. In an attempt to remedy this situation the ASPR regulations con-
cerning profit and fee were substantially revised in August, 1963. Weighted 
guidelines are provided to the contracting officer to use in establishing a pro-
fit or fee objective. An initial dollar amount of profit or fee is developed based 
on the contractor's input to total performance by applying a percentage factor 
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to the various elements of cost. In addition, the system provides for percen-
tage factors to be applied against total costs based on: 
(a) the contractor's assumption of contract cost risk 
(b) the record of contractor's performance 
(c) other factors such as source of resources and special achieve-
ment, if any, required by the contract. 
The new policy is intended to improve the use of the profit motive as 
a stimulus for effective and economical contract performance. 
The profit guidelines were developed because existing profit policy 
guidance was too general and imprecise to result in proper use of profits as 
an inducement to cost reduction. Several studies had affirmed that the previous 
profit policy had resulted in contracts with an unchanging level of profits averaging 
about three per cent of total costs, regardless of whether contractors had a re-
cord of good work at low cost, whether they used their own facilities and capi-
tal, and whether they were willing to undertake work at substantial price risks. 
The purpose of the Weighted Guidelines policy is to face contractors with a 
wider range of return and a more direct relationship between the amount of 
profit or loss on a contract and the degree of excellence of performance. 
ASPR 3-808.4 spells out the profit factors and weight ranges as follows: 
Profit Factors 
Contractor's Input to Total Performance 
Purchased Parts 
Subcontracted Items 
Other Materials 
Engineering Labor 
Engineering Overhead 
Manufacturing Labor 
Manufacturing Overhead 
Weight Range 
1-4% 
1-5% 
1-4% 
9-15% 
6-9% 
5-9% 
4-7% 
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General & Administrative Expense 
Contractor's Assumption of Risk 
Record of Past Performance 
Selected Factors 
6-8% 
0-7% 
-2-+2% 
-2-+2% 
Under the weighted guidelines method, the contracting officer attempts 
to measure the "Contractor's Input to Total Performance" by the assignment 
of a profit percentage within the designated weight ranges to each element of 
cost. Such costs are multiplied by the specific percentages to arrive at specific 
dollar profits. The sum of the dollar profits for all of the cost elements repre-
sents the profit objective at this point. This amount is then divided by the total 
recognized costs to determine the composite profit percentage. To this com-
posite percentage, the contracting officer shall then add the specific percentages 
assigned for cost risk, performance, and the other selected factors, to arrive 
at a total profit percentage. He then multiplies the total recognized contract 
costs by this total profit percentage to determine the profit objective. See 
Table 6 for an example. 
In general, this new formula approach stands a good chance of working 
because it restricts subjectiveness on the part of the government buyers. When 
is it used? Weighted Guidelines will be used whenever a cost analysis is re-
quired, viz. , when the government is buying without competition. Theoretically, 
this new system reduces time spent negotiating profits and it rewards good 
performance while penalizing poor performance. 
2. Audit as a Government Aid 
The government has always had a policy of requiring contractors to 
submit cost and pricing data in support of their proposals on negotiated con-
tracts. 
ASPR allows the contracting officer to examine the records of the con-
tractor relating to the cost and pricing data submitted in conjunction with the 
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Table 6 
Weighted Guidelines 
Firm Fixed Price Contract for Contractor-Developed Military Item 
Estimated Assigned Profit 
Factors Costs Weights Dollars 
Contractor's Input to 
Total Performance 
Purchased Parts $ 750, 000 3% $ 22,500 
Subcontracted Items 750, 000 4 30, 000 
Other Materials 500, 000 3 15, 000 
Engineering Labor 50, 000 11.3 5, 650 
Engineering Overhead 25, 000 7.6 1, 900 
Manufacturing Labor 1, 100, 000 6.4 70,400 
Manufacturing Overhead 1, 325, 000 6.4 84, 800 
G&A Expenses 500, 000 7.55 37.750 
Totals $5, 000, 000 $268, 000 
Composite Weight 
(Profit Dollars + E std. Costs) 5.36% 
Risk 7. 00% 
Performance 2. 00% 
Selected Factors 2. 00% 
Totals Using Weighted 
Guidelines Method $5, 000, 000 16.36% $818, 000 
Special Consideration 3. 00% 150, 000 
Profit Objective 19.36% $968, 000 
Source: Government Prime Contracts, Procurement Associates, March, 
1964, p. C-3-11. 
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negotiation of the contract. ASPR 7-104.41 requires the Audit and Records 
Clause be inserted in any negotiated cost reimbursement type, incentive or 
price redeterminable contract. This clause requires the prime contractor 
to insert the same requirement in all subcontracts except firm fixed price sub-
contracts under $100, 000. 
The determination as to the necessity of an audit report for pricing 
purposes is the responsibility of the contracting officer. Such audit reports 
are useful to the contracting officer in: 
(a) the evaluation of overhead allocations, purchasing management 
efficiency, and similar cost elements 
(b) both the initial and subsequent pricing of contracts containing 
price revision clauses 
(c) establishing limitations on costs and price revision adjustments 
(d) establishing negotiated overhead rates for cost-reimbursement 
type contracts. 
Usually, a contracting officer will request an audit service if he is 
' 
procuring a new product for which cost experience is lacking; or there is a 
lack of knowledge concerning the contractor's accounting policies, cost systems, 
or substantially changed methods or levels of operation. 
3. Profit Limitations 
Initially, there were two types of limitations imposed on fees which 
may be awarded contractors and subcontractors for performing cost-type con-
tracts -- statutory and administrative. 
Statute limits, imposed by Congress, restrict the fee on a cost-type 
contract to 10% of the estimated cost, except for contracts covering experimental, 
developmental, or research work, which may legally bear a fee of up to 15% of 
estimated cost, and contracts for architectural or engineering services relating 
to public works or utility projects, which may bear a fee of only 6% of estimated 
cost. 
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In addition to the legal limits. administrative order prohibited fees 
in excess of 10% of estimated cost for experimental. research. and develop-
ment contracts and 7% for all other contracts. except those limited to 6% by 
statute. The maximum fee possible on CPIF contracts may exceed adminis-
trative limits. but not those imposed by statute. 
With the exception of provisions of the Vinson-Trammell Act for pro-
curement of ships and aircraft under certain circumstances, there are no 
legal restrictions on profits on fixed-price contracts, except that they be 
"reasonable". according to ASPR 3-808. 1(c). 
As indicated earlier in the chapter. the Weighted Guidelines method 
of establishing profit objective offers a more direct relationship between the 
amount of profit or loss on a contract and the degree of excellence of perfor-
mance. As a result. the administrative limitations. imposed by the Depart-
ment of Defense, have been removed and the weighted guidelines approach 
will be used. In the event that the use of weighted guidelines results in es-
tablishing a fee objective higher than the statutory limitations, the statutory limits 
will prevail. 
Defense contractor profits. at least as a percentage of sales, have 
been declining steadily over the past few years. The following information 
reflects this trend; it is based on per cent net profit on sales of fifty-one aero-
. 3 
space compames: 
1951 3.2% 
1957 2.9 
1958 2.4 
1959 1.6 
1960 1.4 
1961 1.8 
1962 1.7 
3 Arthur D. Little, Inc .• How Sick is The Defense Industry?, 4th edition 
(September 10, 1963), p. 53. 
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Although proof is lacking, there are indications that the reasons for the 
weakening performance include: increasedcompetition; adverse changes in 
sales mix, caused by the increasing use of low-fee incentive contracts; re-
ductions in the fees and target profits that contractors are able to negotiate; 
increased non-allowable costs through sharper negotiation by the government; 
tightening of ASPR; and higher costs of contract administration not fully re-
coverable in fixed-price type contracts. 4 
E. Contract Awards 
1. Types of Contracts 
The contracting officer has at his disposal a broad range of contract 
types which he and the contractor are free to use, subject to current policies 
of the Department of Defense and the type of work to be done. 
ASPR lays down guidelines for choice of contract type. It states that 
profit should be proportional to performance and that the contractor is motivated 
best by being allowed to assume risk as quickly as possible. The government 
prefers the firm-fixed price contract; but in instances where objectives other 
than cost control, such as performance or time, are of overriding importance, 
a type of contract is used that offers incentive to the contractor to meet the 
government's objectives. 
The following major types of contracts are available for use by the 
government: 
Firm-fixed price (FFP) - This type of contract is subject to no ad-
justment based on cost experience of the contractor. It offers maximum in-
centive to contractors and requires the least administrative burden. FFP is 
used where competition is adequate, procurement experience with the same or 
similar products is extensive, good costs are available, or uncertainties are 
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low enough so that the contractor is willing to accept the price. The FFP con-
tract is generally used to procure standard or modified commercial articles or 
military items for which sound prices can be developed. 
Prospective price redetermination at a stated time or times during 
performance - This type contract provides for a firm-fixed price for a stated 
period. At the end of that time, usually about a year, the price is reviewed 
and raised or lowered in the light of costs actually experienced. A ceiling 
price may be inserted at the outset. This type has been popular where pro-
duction programs have extended over a long period of time. 
Fixed-price contract with escalation - Is similar to FFP but permits 
revision of the price upon the occurrence of certain specifically defined contin-
gencies, such as increases in material or labor costs. This provision is used 
where the performance period is long and where the contingencies are beyond 
the control of the contractor. 
Fixed-price incentive - Contracts provide for an adjustment of profit 
and establishment of a final price by a formula which is based on the relation-
ship between final negotiated total cost and total target costs. The FPI contract 
is used where FFP contracts are inappropriate due to lack of good pricing 
data, but where assumption of a degree of cost responsibility provides an 
incentive for effective cost control. 
In addition to the above, there are a number of cost-type contracts 
which can be used when it is impossible to estimate what costs will be before 
they are incurred. A maximum total cost is always included in cost-type con-
tracts, but this serves only as a basis for obligations and to establish a point 
where the contractor must get approval before continuing (except at his own 
risk). In addition to the factor of uncertainty, before a cost-type contract 
can be used, the government must be satisfied that the contractor's accounting 
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system is adequate to determine the costs applicable to the contract and that 
appropriate surveillance can be maintained by government personnel to pre-
vent the use of wasteful or inefficient methods. 5 
A short description of the major features of cost-type contracts is 
presented below: 
Cost contracts reimburse the contractor for costs, but allow no fee. 
They are used in contracting with educational or other non-profit organizations 
for R&D or for facilities contracts. 
Cost-sharing contracts provide for no fee and reimbursement for only 
a predetermined percentage of the costs incurred. These contracts are used 
in contracting with non profit groups, but usually on R&D work where it is 
agreed that the results may have commercial benefit for the contractor. 
Cost plus a fixed fee - CPFF contracts provide a contractor with mini-
mum stimulus for efficiency and consequently require continuous surveillance 
by government personnel, it is widely used where the scope and feasibility 
of a contract are unknown. ASPR directs its use only in preliminary stages 
of research, before the government has established performance objectives. 
Cost plus incentive fee contracts - CPIF contracts provide for fee 
adjustment according to a formula which is based on the relationship between 
total allowable costs and target costs. Negotiations initially set a target cost, 
target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula. CPIF 
is particularly useful in the development and testing phases of weapon ac-
quisition, where a formula that is likely to provide a positive profit in:centive 
for effective management can be negotiated. When development is far enough 
along that performance objectives can be established, incentives based on per-
formance may be included where practical. The range between minimum and 
maximum fee usually widens as a system develops toward the production stage, 
so long as the fee remains within the statutory limits. 
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Since the type of contract used can have a profound effect on a con-
tractor's profitability, it is interesting to note the changes in the mix of con-
tract types awarded. Figure 2 shows the awards made by type of contract as 
a per cent of the dollar value of total awards. The most significant trends re-
late to the sudden decline of the FP - Redeterminable type contract and the 
vast increase in CPFF contracts up to 1962. 
A small but potentially significant trend appeared in fiscal 1962 with 
the increased use of CPIF contracts. The Secretary of Defense ordered that 
more use be made of that type contract, as the first step in a long-range plan 
to return to firm fixed-price (FFP) contracting, which was the rule before 
World War IT. The goal was to reduce CPFF awards from the 32.5% experienced 
in fiscal 1962 to 12% by 1965 and to enable contractors to make more profit. 
The incentives to reduce costs, reasons DOD, should not only make a healthier 
industry, but reduce total procurement costs as well. Figure 3 shows that 
DOD is ahead of their planned reduction of CPFF awards. 
CPFF contracts during the first ten months of fiscal 1963 dropped to 
23.3% of the total --the lowest level since fiscal 1955. As a result of these 
efforts, the value of annual awards under CPFF contracts has declined by 
$3.2 billion on a basis comparable to fiscal 1961. Defense Secretary McNamara 
estimates that for each dollar shifted to firm fixed-price and incentive con-
tracts, DOD reduces final costs by at least 10% --a total saving of $320 million. 
The incentive push may or may not work out as expected; there has not 
yet been sufficient experience to evaluate its effect on contractors. In the re-
cent past, targets for CPIF contracts have been averaging about 5% fee --
a little less than the 7% available on CPFF work. Minimum fees have been 
in the range of 4 1/2 - 5% and the maximum about 9% of allowable cost, with a 
cost-sharing ratio such that the contractor receives 20- 25% of cost reductions. 
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"New" incentive contracts will, according to DOD, have permissable fees 
ranging from O% or less up the the full 15% allowed by law, with sharing ratios 
as high as 50 - 50. 6 
2. Importance of Time, Cost and Quality 
The criteria for contractor selection are complex. Earlier sections 
of this chapter have shown that the decision makers may utilize various tools 
in deciding upon a contractor, viz., a co1nprehensi ve review and evaluation of 
proposals, weighted guidelines, government audit of bidder's records, etc. 
The government is usually faced with the problem of buying a product within 
a certain time schedule, for a certain number of dollars, and with a specified 
level of quality. Hence, time, cost and quality are all important to the govern-
ment buyer; however, these variables are often difficult to predict. Initial de-
velopment cost predictions have proved on the average to be less accurate than 
development time estimates, which in turn were somewhat less accurate than 
technical performance predictions. 7 Government agencies typically attach 
less weight to contractor cost estimates than to performance and time estimates. 
3. Effect of Contractor's Past Performance 
Another approach to source selection decisions is to choose the firm 
whose technical, managerial, and physical resources are best suited to the 
contemplated program tasks. The evaluation of bidders for R&D contracts 
often turns on an evaluation of the contractor's ability to solve the technical 
problems. Even when technical uncertainty is not substantial, a bidder's 
capability must be considered in connection with its proposed designs, since 
the ability of a firm in reducing a design to practice might be different from 
its ability to conceive the design in the first place. As a chairman of the 
6Ibid. 
7 Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapon Acquisition 
Process: An Economic Analysis, Harvard Business School, 1962, p. 366. 
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Air Force's first Source Selection Board remarked about the management com-
petition approach,. "Source Selection ... is the selection of a contractor rather 
than the selection of a design. " 8 
An important government criterion for selecting major defense contrac-
tors is effectiveness of the competing contractors' past performance. The 
government recently established a uniform method of determining and recording 
the effectiveness of contractors in meeting their contractual commitments under 
contracts for engineering development and operational-systems development. 
The existence of this procedure will increase the importance to the contractor 
of satisfying his agreements in regard to schedule, cost and technical perfor-
mance. This procedure which is known as "The Evaluation of the Performance 
of Major Development Contractors" will be covered in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
4. Incentives 
The incentive principle holds, in brief that a contractor should be mo-
tivated, in calculable monetary terms, (a) to turn out a product that meets 
significantly advanced performance goals, (b) to improve the contract schedule, 
(c) to substantially reduce the costs of the work, or (d) to complete the project 
under a weighted combination of some or all of these objectives. 9 The principle 
is not a new one but the emphasis that it is receiving is new and is at the core 
of a major evolution in procurement policy and practice. 
In essence, nearly all incentives take the form of a sharing arrangement, 
generally expressed as a percentage ratio. For example, if a 60/40 cost 
sharing formula were negotiated, the government would pay 60 cents, and the 
contractor 40 cents, of every dollar by which actual costs increased. Conversely, 
8Ibid,, p. 368. 
9 Department of Defense, Incentive Contracting Guide, Dec., 1963, p. 1. 
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for every dollar saved, the government would retain 60 cents, and the contrac-
tor's profit would increase by 40 cents. In other words, over the range of 
costs where the sharing arrangement is operative, the contractor must look 
at every dollar he spends as though 40 per cent of it were his. Profit is thus 
turned to the contractor's control of a variable on which his management skills 
can have a significant effect. Incentive patterns may be arranged for equip-
ment performance in the same way; specific standards are established for 
these performance goals, and test procedures are agreed upon. The incentive 
targets might be tied to such characteristics as range, speed, thrust, or 
maneuverability. In terms of delivery incentives, rewards or penalties may 
relate, for example, to end-item delivery, test completions, or prototype 
acceptance. 
In most large development contracts, the incentive pattern used em-
bodies not only cost, but performance and schedule incentives as well. Of pri-
mary importance, then, is the weighting of each incentive objective in accordance 
with what the government and the contractor take to be the basic purposes of 
the contract. Ih the development stage, for example, more than half of the 
total contractual fee (profit) swing might be assigned to the equipment perfor-
mance incentives. Later, when a number of fiscal configuration items are being 
procured for operational evaluation and test, the objectives might be rebalanced. 
Cost control might assume a greater weight. In both cases, either a fixed-
price-incentive or a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract might be used. In sub-
sequent procurements of the item, however, the contract type would certainly 
be FPIF, probably with the entire weight placed on cost control. A sharing 
formula providing for as much as 50 per cent division of savings or excesses 
might be possible at this stage. Throughout the procurement cycle, then, the 
weight given to the various incentive elements could have been re-evaluated 
and realigned a number of times. 
45 
F. Analysis of Government Controls Imposed on Contractors 
To regard the defense contract as merely a special kind of sales con-
tract is to misunderstand its true character. The defense contract not only 
sets forth the description and performance requirements of the article or 
system being purchased, the compensation to be paid the producer, and the 
mode of payment; it also spells out the many restrictions on the activities of 
the defense contractor. For example, defense contractors are required to 
pay their employees a minimum wage, to refrain from discrimination, to use 
only materials of domestic origin; and to favor small business concerns in sub-
t . 10 contrac mg. 
The contract also spells out the management decisions which may re-
quire the approval of, or initiation by, the government. Included among such 
decisions are those which change the specification of the article being produced, 
determines whether to make or buy, and those which concern contractual re-
lationships with subcontractors. Many ~fense contracts also give the govern-
ment the right to adjust the compensation both during the performance of the 
contract and afterwards, and to examine the books and operations of the 
defense contractor. 
It is of interest to note, at this point, that Graeme C. Bannerman. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Procurement) of the Department of Defense, has said: 
In the government's relations with industry both parties 
should find it to their mutual advantage to cooperate in the 
free exchange of factual data. Government's representatives 
should become thoroughly familiar with the individual esti-
mating procedures used by the different contractors, and 
systems should be devised cooperatively for the measurement 
of after-the-fact results, testing the results against the es-
timates to determine how effectively the firm is being managed. 
More particularly, information that is available to industry 
management should be equally available to government nego-
tiators in the pricing of contracts. 11 
10
"Government Contract Restrictions}' Harvard Business Review, May -
June, 1964, p. 21. 
11
"Two Views on New Procurement Management Trends," The Federal 
Accountant, Sept. 1962, p. 121. 
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1. PERT and PERT/Cost 
The Special Projects Office of the U.S. Navy, concerned with perfor-
mance trends in the execution of large military development programs, intro-
duced PERT on its Polaris Weapon Systems in 1958. Program Evaluation 
Review Technique (PERT) provides the government with a method of analyzing 
. the current plans and schedules of defense contractors, the progress to date 
against program objectives, and the outlook for meeting ultimate objectives 
on time. 
Oversimplified, PERT reports by showing about the same thing on its 
flow charts as a tournament sheet in a golf match, displaying the various flights 
as they narrow down to the finals. Those golfers who draw byes spend less 
time playing golf, and those scheduled for every flight have to spend more 
time on the course. The difference is that PERT is not concerned with who 
wins the tournament, but how soon the tournament will be completed, and how. 
by readjusting the byes they can get it over with sooner. 12 
To date, PERT has spread rapidly through the defense industry. Govern-
ment agencies are making PERT an integral part of almost every major defense 
and space program. In this age of complex systems, the government requires 
contractors to use management control techniques such as PERT to establish 
closer relationship between government and industry. 
Specifically, PERT (1) states the sequence of progress benchmarks in 
a given program as they must occur under current planning to achieve success, 
(2) measures the relative uncertainty of meeting these benchmarks, (3) reveals 
critical areas and slack areas, (4) computes current probability of meeting dates 
by comparing probabilities and deadlines. 13 On major programs, medium to 
1211How PERT Predicts for the Navy, " Armed Forces Management, July, 
1959, p. 12. 
13
clinton J. Chamberlain, "Coming Era in Engineering Management," 
Harvard Business Review, September - October 1961, p. 87. 
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large digital computers (IBM 650/705) are used to consolidate the PERT infor-
mation, put it in prospective and context, and come up with what amounts to a 
highly educated guess - based on statistical probabilities -- on exactly what 
area of the program is behind, ahead of, or on schedule. 
In essence, the government receives information on a regular basis 
which reflects each and every important step a contractor has taken, will take, 
or should have taken in order to accomplish his contractual requirements on 
time. 
In addition to scheduling a major program in considerable detail, 
PERT/Cost determines the amount of money budgeted and spent for each and 
every event (milestone) on the PERT flow chart. This enables the government 
to determine financial status as well as schedule status on a very detailed level. 
In short, if a contractor has a contractual requirement to report via PERT or 
PERT/Cost, he is extremely vulnerable to having his program actually "managed" 
by the government. 
2. Subcontract Control 
Subcontractors represent an important part of the defense contracting 
system. For example, a survey of 61 major defense firms showed that on the 
average more than 50% of their military contract receipts were subcontracted 
to other firms. 14 Consequently, the government is interested in the purchasing 
practices used by prime contractors and major subcontractors, and is insisting 
that these contractors and major subcontractors, use the same procurement 
methods used by the government in placing prime contracts. 
There is no privity of contract between the government and the subcon-
tractor, and, therefore, all legal relations involving a subcontractor must be 
14Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition 
Process: An Economic Analysis, Harvard Business School, 1962, p. 386. 
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settled between the prime and subcontractor. The term "privity", as used 
in government contract law, designates the relation of right and duty that 
exists between the immediate parties to a contract. A prime contractor is in 
privity with both a subcontractor and the government. The legal significance 
of the term lies in the fact that the government may look only to the person 
with whom it has privity for the fulfillment of the contract, namely the prime 
contractor; the subcontractor owes responsibility only to the prime. 
In 1959, ASPR 3-901 formally authorized the service agencies to re-
view contractor make or buy plans to discover possible inconsistencies with the 
governmentr s interest. The buying agencies exercise various types and levels 
of review and control over the subcontractor selection decisions. Subcontracts 
involving a fairly small dollar volume are seldom reviewed individually by 
buying agency personnel. Instead, they generally pass on the prime contrac-
torr s purchasing system and procedures, and if these are considered satis-
factory, the prime is authorized to make subcontractor choices autonomously 
within certain dollar limits. More important subsystem subcontractor choices 
are typically reviewed individually by the services at several steps in the selec-
tion process, especially when an initial list of bidders is compiled and when 
the choice is finally narrowed to a single firm. 15 
In several instances, the buying agency insisted that a subcontractor 
more or less unacceptable to the prime contractor be employed. In some 
cases, prime contractors have attempted to disclaim responsibility for the 
imposed subcontractorrs performance. Usually the ability of a prime contrac-
tor to make such a disclaimer effectively depends upon its bargaining position. 
One contractor forced by the service into an unhappy "marriage" with another 
firm insisted (unsuccessfully) upon a higher profit rate for risking its reputa-
tion in a situation it could not control. 16 
15Ibid., p. 4.02. 
16Ibid., p. 404. 
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3. Contract Performance Evaluation 
The "Contractor Performance Evaluation" (CPE) system resulted from 
DOD Directive 5l26. 38, August 1, 1963. This system may be a matter of life 
or death to many defense companies because it is designed to create within 
the government a "memory" of contractor performance, and a means for taking 
this performance record into account in future source selection actions. It is 
now being applied to approximately 100 Army, Navy and Air Force contracts, 
for engineering development and operational systems development which expend 
more than $5, 000, 000 in one year or which have a total value of $20, 000, 000. 17 
It is contemplated that it will eventually be extended to contracts of $1, 000, 000, 
or more. 
Under this system, each contractor is evaluated every six months and 
at the completion of the contract with regard to his performance in three princi-
pal areas --Technical Performance, Cost, and Schedule. No adjective or 
numerical ratings are used, the contractor's performance is rated against his 
contract commitments. The procedure is initiated by the contractor when he 
provides periodic reports and current information to the project office. The 
Project Manager makes the initial evaluation. His report is forwarded to a 
Contractor Performance Evaluation Group established at the Department level 
under the authority of the Service Secretary (e. g., Secretary of the Navy). This 
group either reviews the report for compliance with policy, and then forwards 
it to the contractor for comment, or performs an independent field evaluation 
suing its own resources and certify the report. 
At the conclusion of a contract an independent evaluation is made and 
the final results are forwarded to the contractor. After the contractor returns 
17 Paul R. McDonald, Government Prime Contracts and Subcontracts 
(Glendora, California: Procurement Associates, 1964), p. L-4-1. 
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the report with his comments, and any ambiguities are resolved, the reports 
are sent to a Contractor Performance Evaluation Office in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, where they are reviewed and placed in a Data Bank and 
made available on a need-to-know basis for future Source Selection Boards for 
use in profit determination (Weighted Guidelines) and upon request to the Re-
negotiation Board. 
4. Small Business Administration 
Small business (less than 500 people) plays two roles in the defense 
industry; that of a prime contractor in its own right and that of a supplier to 
prime contractors. 
As Table 7 indicates, the small business share in prime contracts in 
fiscal 1960 was 1. 2% of the dollar volume of the prime contracts for missiles, 
2. 6% for aircraft, and 8. 7% for ships. In contrast, small business did relatively 
well in the non-weapons sectors, with 68% of the textile volume, 50% of the 
construction volume, and 57% of the subsistence volume. In 1961 the President 
directed that the share of small business contracts be increased by 10%. Since 
that time, the Secretary of Defense has made a concerted effort to accomplish 
this objective by increasing the ability of small businesses to upgrade their 
facilities and research abilities. The Department of Defense has established 
a program to help small businesses obtain subcontracts as well. In essence, 
DOD policy is to favor prime contractors who intend to subcontract large dollar 
amounts to small businesses. 
The Small Business Act of 1958 authorizes that individual purchases and 
classes of purchases may be "set aside" for small business (i.e., only small 
business may bid) by joint agreement with the procuring agency and the Small 
Business Administration. 
The Department of Defense has appointed 380 small business specialists 
with the responsibilities of assisting individual small businesses and generally 
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Table 7 
Small Business Procurement: Fiscal Year 1960 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
All Businesses Small Businesses 
Major Hard Goods: Net Value Net Value Per Cent 
Actions of $10, 000 or more ~14. 808.2 ~636. 7 4.3% 
Aircraft $ 4,788.4 $ 126. 1 2. 6% 
Guided missiles 4, 983.7 59. 0 1.2 
Ships 1, 009. 7 88.0 8.7 
Tanks 403.9 58.8 14.6 
Weapons 120.8 22.9 19.0 
Ammunition 475.7 47.2 9. 9 
Electronics 3, 026.2 234.8 7.8 
Services: 
Actions of $10, 000 or more $ 1, 321.2 $ 283.1 21.4% 
Subtotal $16, 129.4 $ 919.8 5. 7% 
All other: 
Actions of $10, 000 or more 3, 629.3 1, 524. 1 42. O% 
Total $19.758. 8 $2,443.9 12.4% 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards. 
July, 1959 -June 1960, p. 22. 
52 
insuring that the small business "potential" is fully realized. 18 
Earlier in this chapter (section F. 3), the Contractor Performance 
Evaluation system was discussed in some detail. Since that system is used to 
maintain a record of contractor performance, language has been inserted to 
penalize contractor performance ratings for "failure or unwillingness" to 
support small business policies with respect to procurement activity. 19 
U.S. small business firms received a record high in defense prime 
contract dollar awards in fiscal 1964. Figures for the year show that awards 
to small firms amounted to $4. 842 billion,. the highest dollar value in the past 
ten years. This dollar value was equivalent to 18% of the total prime contract 
awards to all business firms in the U.S. 20 
5. Changes Clause 
Another important control imposed on the defense contractor is the 
"Changes Clause". ASPR 7-103.2 gives the government the right to make 
changes in (1) the drawings, designs or specifications where the supplies are 
specially manufactured for the government; (2) the method of shipment or 
packing and the place of delivery; and (3) the amount of government-furnished 
property in the case of cost reimbursement type supply contracts. These 
changes are made by a means of a "change order", issued by the contracting 
officer. The clause provides that the contracting officer may issue a "change 
order" without the consent of the contractor since by signing the contract, the 
contractor agrees that the right is reserved to the government. Once the con-
tractor receives a properly executed change order, he is required to make the 
change as soon as possible. The Changes Clause provides for an equitable 
18House, Select Committee on Small Business, Final Report, 85th 
Contress, 2nd Session (1959), p. 80. 
19
"Daily Report for Executives", November 4, 1964, p. 1. 
20 Department of Defense, Small Business Report, November, 1964, p. 2. 
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adjustment in the price or delivery schedule. Failure to agree to any adjust-
ment is considered a dispute and 1he contractor may appeal to the Armed 
Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), after proceeding with the con-
tract as changed. Thus, a contractor may not refuse to perform to a change 
unless the directed change is outside the general scope of the contract. 
6. Proposed CEIS 
Another system which furthers the Defense Department's control over 
contractor performance is DOD's proposed "Cost and Economic Information 
System" (CEIS). This new system is being studied by McKinsey & Co., New 
21 York consultants, under an $800, 000 contract from DOD. 
CEIS was promulgated July 7. 1964, by DOD directive 7041.7. The 
directive was written partially with the concept in mind, rather than specifics 
as to what should be done. Its purpose is to coordinate and improve on other 
systems of cost estimating used previously and in use now by DOD. The need 
for better cost information, DOD sources state, was pointed up by the TFX 
hearings and by frequent reports of the General Accounting Office, taking the 
Defense Department to task for failure to get sufficient cost data when awarding 
certain contracts. 
The main objective of CEIS is to provide military departments with 
reliable and timely cost and economic data on weapons systems, major items 
of equipment and defense contractor employment. CEIS also will provide in-
22 formation on the economic impact of cutting back defense installations. Tests 
are now being performed to verify that 1he best reporting form is being used by 
industry, and that proper information is being obtained in order to establish 
standards. It will be three years or more before this new system is completely 
installed. 
21Richard C. Sizemore, "DOD Polishing Up Cost Data System," Electronic 
News, November 20, 1964, p. 1. 
22Ibid. 
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CEIS will collect comparable information for all armed services and 
will interface with PERT/Cost analysis system. It will also establish data 
banks to be kept by the defense departments, and will cover the life cycle of 
a weapons system from R&D through production. 
One executive summarized the views of many by stating that "it's just 
another hobble" for the defense industry that is complaining that the staff over-
head required to meet DOD reporting requirements is already costly and cum-
23 bersome. 
G. Disputes, Appeals and Terminations 
No matter how carefully a contract is negotiated and written, because 
of the complex nature of the government contracting process and the involved 
relationship of the contractor and the government, disputes can and often do arise 
under government contracts. Circumstances, and personnel, change. Govern-
ment and contractor personnel representing various types of specialties, property, 
audit, inspection, security, etc., become involved in the administration of the 
contract. Their diverse interests and the administrative procedures involved 
result in many disagreements. The Disputes Clause included in government 
contracts is designed to insure that disagreements between the contractor and 
the government will not interfere with the scheduled performance of the contract 
and to provide a channel by which disagreements and differences can be re-
solved by the persons directly involved. 
The right of the government to terminate a contract for default and the 
rights and liabilities of the parties in such a termination are set forth in the 
Default Clause (ASPR 8-707) for fixed price supply contracts which deals ex-
clusively with default, and for cost type contracts in ASPR 8-702, which covers 
both termination for default and termination for the convenience of the government. 
23 Ray Connolly, "New Cost Plan Seen Control Effort by DOD", Electronic 
News, December 10, 1964, p. 7. 
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Both clauses permit the government to terminate a contract for default when 
there is a failure or refusal of the contractor to deliver the required supplies 
or perform the required services, or when there is a failure of the contractor 
to make progress so as to endanger performance of the contract. This caluse 
expressly provides that before terminating a contract for default, the contrac-
tor must be given the opportunity to cure any such default except for failure to 
make timely delivery. 
1. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) 
If agreement between the two parties cannot be reached, then the Disputes 
Clause provides that the contracting officer may make a unilateral decision 
from which the contractor's only recourse is to appeal to the Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals. The ASBCA was created by a joint directive of the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force effective 1 May 1949. It is the 
authorized representative of the Secretary of Defense in hearing, considering and 
determining appeals by contractors from decisions of contracting officers. The 
members of the board must be trained in law. Present board members consist 
of both civilian and military appointees. 24 
In one recent year, the ASBCA gave 627 decisions involving monetary 
claims of $26,700, 000. Of this amount approximately $13. 9 million were de-
25 
cided in favor of the contractor and $12. 8 million in favor of the government. 
2. Extraordinary Contractual Actions 
Section XVII of the ASPR establishes uniform regulations for entering into, 
amending, or modifying contracts to facilitate the extra-ordinary emergency 
authority granted by the Act of 28 August 1958 (P. L. 85-804) as implemented by 
24Paul R. McDonald, Government Prime Contracts and Subcontracts 
(Glendora, California: Procurement Associates, 1964), p. M-1-6. 
25Ib.d 
_1_., p. M-1-12. 
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26 Executive Order No. 10789 dated 14 November 1958. The Act empowers the 
President to authorize departments and agencies exercising functions in connec-
tion with the national defense, to enter into contracts, or into amendments, and 
to make advance payments without regard to other provisions of law relating to 
the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts, whenever 
such action would facilitate the national defense. This authority is significant 
to contractors in that it provides a means for relief from losses under govern-
ment contracts, under certain circumstances, when they have no specific con-
tractual provision on which to base their claim. 
A Public Law 85-804 request is not a substitute for appealing a decision 
to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Usually, however, a small 
Disputes Claim may be considered with a larger claim which can be handled 
only under Public Law 85-804. In any case, the Defense Department has used 
the authority conferred by this act very sparingly. 
3. Terminations for Default or Convenience 
The government has the right in fixed price supply contracts subject to 
the notice requirements of the clause to terminate all or any part of the contract 
for default if the contractor: 
(a) fails to make delivery within the time specified; 
(b) fails to perform any other provision of the contract 
(c) fails to make progress so as the endanger performance of the contract. 
Default actions are not taken lightly by the government. A default action 
is a black mark on the contractor's record. Continual defaults make him in-
eligible to receive further government contracts. In addition, the contractor 
is faced with excess reprocurement costs and, in some instances, damages. 
Therefore, the average contractor will usually fight the default action by appealing 
to the ASBCA. 
26Ibid., p. M-2-1. 
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The major right acquired by the government upon a termination for 
default is the right to purchase the terminated items elsewhere and hold the 
contractor liable for any excess costs if the costs of the repurchased items 
exceed the contract price. 
A second type of contract termination is known as the Termination for 
Convenience of the government. Unlike a termination for default, termination 
for convenience can not be appealed by the contractor. For example, if a con-
tractor missed the contractual delivery schedule for reasons beyond his control, 
he could receive a termination for convenience instead of a termination for de-
fault. In short, the contractor's performance of work may be terminated by the 
government in whole, or from time to time in part, whenever the contracting 
officer determines that it is in the best interest of the government. It is a 
unilateral decision. 
When a contract is terminated, the contractor receives: 
(a) 2% profit on materials not yet processed 
(b) the full contract fee for all completed work 
(c) no profit on settlement expenses 
(d) no profit on storing and preserving government property. 
The standard termination clauses for prime contracts provide that after 
receipt of notice of termination, the prime contractor shall terminate all sub-
contracts relating to the prime contract. Settlements with subcontractors are 
made in general conformity with the policies and procedures applicable to 
terminated prime contracts. The subcontractor has no contractual rights 
against the government. The rights of a subcontractor are against the prime 
contractor only. 
Generally speaking, the government is well protected in termination 
cases. For example, even if a termination clause is not in the contract, if ASPR 
states it should be there, in fact, it is applicalie just as if it were there. 
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H. Environment of Uncertainty & Conclusions 
The defense contracting process is characterized by a unique set of 
uncertainties which differentiates it from other economic activity. The first 
such uncertainty has to do with the prediction of technical feasibility. This in 
turn has two aspects: uncertainty as to whether a system of certain general 
characteristics is feasible at all, and uncertainty about the exact level of 
performance and reliability which can be attained. On the other hand, develop-
ment time and cost predictions are difficult to predict. Historical experience 
shows that development time estimates frequently turn out to be erroneous by 
as much as 100%, and early development cost projections by even greater 
margins. 27 The program decision uncertainties are another major consideration. 
For example, in a weapons system the problem can be divided into two questions: 
(1) when will the weapon system be needed, and (2) against what offensive and 
defensive capabilities will it be employed? The rapidly changing requirements of 
military technology force firms to shift their product lines rapidly -- rockets 
instead of piston or jet engines, complex electronic gear instead of large 
quantities of airframes and so on. An inherent uncertainty in the defense 
business is the unpredictability of a market completely dominated by one buyer. 
It introduces to some extent the kind of instabilities associated with central 
planning, where one agency can arbitrarily alter the direction of major programs. 
There are complications built into the annual appropriation process. Each year 
Congress votes a defense budget. To prepare the annual budget, however, the 
units administering the major programs must submit their financial require-
ments some three to five years in advance of expected expenditure dates, de-
spite all the technological and strategic uncertainties to which they are subject. 28 
27 Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition 
Process: An Economic Analysis, Harvard University, 1962, p. 300. 
2 8
william R. Kinter, Forging a New Sword: A Study of the Department of 
Defense (New York: Harper, 1958), Chap. 9. 
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When the initial estimate is finally translated one or two years later into the 
authority to spend, it is not surprising that the financial plans may have been 
overtaken by events Financial crises continually arise, to be met by shifting 
funds from one program to another. To the defense contractors, the possibility 
of such fiscal reprogramming means further uncertainty. 
In short, the defense contractor's lot is not an easy one. To be sure, 
he has a customer who agrees to pay his costs during the development period, 
whatever the outcome may be. The cost reimbursement contract is a distinc-
tive feature of the defense business. Yet, as was indicated early in this chapter, 
the defense contractor deals with a bureaucratic maze for a customer and the 
character of the business brings the customer into the contractor's internal 
operations in a way that restricts his freedom to manage his own business. In 
addition, the contractor is faced with the numerous uncertainties which are in-
herent in defense contracting. 
CHAPTER V 
FUTURE OF DEFENSE SPENDING 
A. Tougher Buying Tactics 
In July, 1962, Defense Secretary McNamara initiated the Defense De-
partment's Cost Reduction Program. At that time, he predicted that costs 
would be cut by $3 billion dollars per year within five years, and that $750 
million would be saved in the first year of the program. The defense secretary 
made good his promise by saving almost $1.4 billion during the first year 
(fiscal1963); and saving $1.9 billion in fiscal1964. As indicated in Table 8, 
the five-year goal was raised to a predicted saving of $4 billion/year starting in 
fiscal 1967. 1 
The impact of such a program on defense contractors is far-reaching. 
The Defense Department has launched a three point attack: 
1. Buying only what is needed to achieve balanced readiness. 
2. Buying at the lowest sound price. 
3. Reducing operating costs through termination of unnecessary 
operations, standardization and consolidation. 
On each front, defense contractors are being affected by changes in 
policy that cut available dollars and change the tactics needed to win them. 
The government has begun a comprehensive re-examination of what and 
how many weapons are needed for the job at hand. A reassessment of the wear-
out and loss figures also are part of this category. Secretary McNamara has 
stated that $104 million were saved by simply making sure an item slated for 
1
secretary McNamara's Second Annual Progress Report to the President, 
July 7, 1964, p. 1. 
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Table 8 
Saving $4 Billion Yearly by 1967 
Buying Only What is Needed 
Closer screening of requirements 
Increased use of excess inventory in lieu of new 
procurement 
Value engineering 
Inventory item reduction 
Buying at Lowest Sound Price 
(in billions) 
$1. 722 
1. 067 
Shift from noncompetitive to competitive procurement 
Shift to incentive price contracts 
Breakout for direct purchases 
Reducing Operating Costs 
TOTOL 
Terminating unnecessary operations 
Consolidation and standardization 
Increasing efficiency of operations 
1. 255 
$4,044 
$1. 116 
427 
145 
34 
375 
668 
24 
600 
155 
500 
Source: Secretary McNamara's Annual Progress Report to the President. 
July. 1964. 
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procurement by one military department was not already in the inventory of 
one of the other military departments. A net savings of $17. 9 million was 
realized, for example, when various types of aircraft which were determined 
to be excess to Navy operating requirements were processed through the Reclama-
tion and Disposal Program for use as spare parts. 2 
Substantial savings were claimed by eliminating from government 
specifications costly material and fabrication processes not essential to the 
proper functioning of the item being procured. In addition, a project to simplify 
and standardize mass paperwork procedures is aimed at slicing $100 million 
a year off the cost of running the department's red tape machine. A typical 
strategem: DOD is buying $200 million worth of data processing equipment that 
it has been renting for $60 million a year. 3 
1. Incentive and Fixed Price Contracts Will be the Rule 
Of particular significance to defense contractors is the Defense Depart-
ment's shift to more competitive procurement. The present goal is to increase 
competitive procurement to a level of about 40% (of total procurement dollars) 
compared with 32. 9% in fiscal 1961. Figure 4 reflects this goal and the per-
formance thru fiscal April, 1964. DOD officials claim that when they are able 
to shift from a single source to competitive procurement, they normally achieve 
a reduction in price of at least 25%. 
One purchasing technique that will be used more widely is the "two-step" 
advertising procedure. Bidders must submit proposals without price quotations; 
proposals are examined by the government buyers and engineers; then bidders 
whose proposals have been approved submit sealed bids, and contracts are 
awarded on the basis of the lowest fixed-price. 
2
Ibid.' p. 21. 
311 Military Toughens Buying Tactics," Steel, April 27, 1964, p. 105. 
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In another big shift, incentive-type contracts are quickly displacing 
the cost-plus-fixed fee (CPFF) variety. In the first half of fiscal 1964, CPFF 
contracts accounted for only 12% of the total versus 38 per cent three years 
earlier. 4 The Defense Department estimates that the saving in this shift is at 
least 10 cents on the dollar, and probably more. By 1967, the savings are 
estimated at $7 50 million a year. 
B. DOD Long Range Plans 
In an economy such as ours, assuming no let-up in the cold war, 
spending on defense will continue to be managed with one eye on the amount and 
quality of defense bought, and the other on the defense budget. The Pentagon 
stresses that the current defense cuts represent a leveling off rather than the 
start of a sharp decline in military spending. Such an appraisal may prove to 
be more accurate than some private predictions that a big drop is in store, for 
a number of costly new weapons systems are now being considered or actually 
in the initial development stage. 
But even a leveling off in outlays is bad news for firms who have been 
accustomed to a rapidly expanding military market. (Figure 5 reflects the actual 
and estimated expenditures for the past five years.) The defense contractor 
must contend with and try to anticipate shifts constantly occ uring in the channeling 
of funds. Even with a steady level of total outlays by DOD, some major programs 
are constantly being phased out as others are accelerated. 
Some firms fortunate enough to be involved in priority programs seem 
likely to continue to score worthwhile sales and earnings gains for some time 
to come. This is true of Lockheed, for example, which should get a boost not 
only from expected large shipments of transport planes but also from further 
4Refer to Chapter IV. E. 1., Figures 2 and 3 for graphic presentations of 
this shift in types of contracts awarded. 
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demand for Polaris missiles and other diversified military items. North 
American Aviations future is brightened by its leading participation in the 
Apollo space project which is expected to make a steadily increasing contribu-
tion to sales over the next several years. United Aircraft continues to make 
upward earnings progress, after experiencing unusually meager results for 
several years. 
A top Pentagon research official, Dr. Eugene Fubini, Deputy Director 
of Defense research and engineering, has predicted that the Defense Department's 
research and development efforts will continue to be funded at the current level 
(about $6. 5 billion per year) and that no sharp cuts are on the horizon. 5 
This is due to the ever-increasing complexity of weapons systems which 
in turn results in the continuation of the long-term trend toward concentration 
of most of the defense contracts with the top 100 contractors. The government will, 
it can be expected, continue to exert pressures for increased subcontracting, 
particularly to small business. 
In short, it appears as if the Defense Department is not planning any 
drastic reduction in the total defense budget. Secretary McNamara has stated, 
however, that "we will be able to reduce the percentage of the gross national 
product devoted to defense by rather substantial amounts between fiscal 1962 
and fiscal 1967. 116 
The period now to 1970 is not likely to see any major revision in the 
concepts of the ASPR. However, the manner in which the Regulations are applied 
may change substantially and periodic changes in individual articles are likely. 
Probably the most dramatic, if not most significant, change in pro-
curement practice will be the drastic decrease in the number of CPFF contracts 
511 Fubini Decries Industry Gloom", Aviation Week, July 13, 1964, p. 19. 
6George C. Wilson, "Cost-Cutting Set as Major Industry Factor", Aviation 
Week, July 13, 1964, p. 17. 
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awarded; CPIF contracts will be used instead. There should be some increase 
in the use of FFP and other fixed-price arrangements. 
Despite the efforts to get government contracting nearer to standard 
commercial practice, government intervention in contractors' offices will in-
crease, not decrease in coming years. The increased complexity of weapons 
systems and the relatively poor performance of industry in relation to original 
cost and time estimates has led to the development of more detailed government 
monitoring, as indicated in Chapter IV. F. Whether justified or not, it appears 
that the Defense Department will, through Weighted Guidelines, PERT, CEIS, 
Contractor Performance Evaluation, Small Business Administration and similar 
controls, continue to enter more into what once was considered the preserve of 
"management prerogatives". 
Among the ideas for improved defense procurement being explored at 
the Pentagon is the concept known as "Real Cost", which would have a significant 
impact on the contracting process if it ever bee omes operational. In simplest 
terms, this involves making awards on the basis of the lowest competitive 
price in which was included the lowest cost to the government over the lifetime 
of the equipment. The initial acquisition cost of an item of military equipment, 
which is now a primary deciding factor, would be only one element in the decision. 
Other factors to be given consideration would be so-called "logistics costs" --
storage, spare parts, etc. -- and the cost of maintaining an item and assuring 
its optimum reliability over its entire life cycle. Under present policies, the 
acquisition cost is often the deciding factor. But for many items, such as 
electronic equipment, the price differential offered by a low bid in the initial 
acquisition cost is often "overpowered", defense officials note, by the cumulative 
costs experienced over the lifetime of the item as a result of the logistics, maintenance 
and reliability factors. It appears probable that some Real Cost evaluation pro-
cedure will be proposed for usage in the next year or so. 7 
7
rrconcept of Real Cost Explored by DODJ' Daily Report for Executives, 
December 4, 1964. 
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The Real Cost procedure will probably be adopted because it is a logical 
supplement to Secretary McNamara's "Five-Year Structure and Financial Pro-
gram". The five-year plan was actually devised by Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Charles J. Hitch. It is an integrated plan of forces, costs, manpower 
and procurement projected over a five-year period. The five-year plan classi-
fies all weapons into force structures. Thus, the cost of delivering a nuclear 
warhead of "X" megatons by. the Air Force's Atlas missile is evaluated against 
doing it by some other weapon, not necessarily Air Force controlled. 
Each military service submits its budget requirements via Technical 
Development Plans which delineate to the Secretary of Defense a technical and 
financial plan over a five-year period. Each new R&D program runs through the 
following phases: 
(1) Research 
(2) Exploratory Development 
(3) Advanced Development 
(4) Engineering Development 
(5) Management & Support 
(6) Operational System Development 
A program cannot be funded to pass from one phase to another without the appro-
val of the Office of the Secretary of Defense via a Technical Department Plan. 
The Defense Department uses this technique to assure that major sys-
tems will be undertaken only when the scientific problems have been solved and 
the task ahead is purely engineering. DOD awards contracts for only a small 
per cent of the total. At a point in time and dollars spent, the contractor sub-
mits a report convering the extent to which development objectives, cost, per-
formance and delivery schedule can be met. The Office of the Secretary of De-
fense then decides whether to proceed. 8 
8 John P. Kushnerick, "The Ultimate Test Program Definition", Aerospace 
Management, July, 1963, p. 12. 
A. Summary 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has attempted to provide a critical analysis of the re-
lationship between the government and the defense contractor. To accomplish 
this goal a study was made of the evolution of government defense procure-
ment policies. Chapter II sets forth a series of facts which indicate that the 
government has advocated the policy of formal advertising, and competitive 
bidding, since 1809. Subsequent chapters reveal, however, that as late as 
1962 eighty-five per cent of the contracts were awarded without advertising. 
In recent years, the Department of Defense has begun to re-emphasize the need 
for more competition. 
The award of military prime contracts has always been concentrated 
in a few companies, as stated in Chapter III. It appears as if there will be 
little change in this practice because the increased complexity of defense system 
production requires large firms to take the responsibility of doing the work. 
It can be expected, however, that the government will continue to influence 
these contractors to subcontract large portions of their work to smaller com-
panies. 
Chapter IV delineates the detailed working relationship between the 
Defense Department and industry. This relationship is controlled by the Armed 
Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) which instruct government employees 
in the methods of obtaining quotations, awarding contracts, monitoring con-
tractor's performance, etc. 
The present trend indicates that the government is attempting to improve 
the use of profit motive as a stimulus to better contractor performance. This 
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trend is reflected in the adoption of new techniques such as Weighted Guide-
lines and incentive type contracts. At the same time, defense contractors 
are being forced to submit to increased government intervention in the conduct 
of large defense production programs. Concrete examples of this may be 
found in the government's use of sophisticated control systems such as Program 
Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT), Contractor Performance Evaluation 
(CPE), and Cost and Economic Information System (CEIS). These controls 
make a company extremely vulnerable to having its defense program actually 
managed by the government. 
Chapter V contains a forecast of the future of defense spending. Secre-
tary of Defense McNamara has undertaken a cost reduction program which will 
shave $3' to $4 billion per year from the defense budget. This reduction, 
coupled with major shifts in funding of programs, will have a substantial effect 
on the defense industry as a whole, and may deal a fatal blow to many defense 
contractors who have been accustomed to a rapidly expanding military market. 
In brief, the defense contractor is faced with a leveling off in defense 
spending, coupled with tighter procurement standards and more intensified 
competition. 
B. In Conclusion 
Having set this not-too-pleasant economic stage, we must turn to the 
possible solutions for this major problem facing defense contractors. To sur-
vive, the individual firm in the defense business must continually weigh and 
evaluate the present and prospective attitudes of the government, insofar as 
they affect the company's product line. The defense contractor must keep 
abreast of the rapid advancement of technology. In short, each firm must seek 
to plan its future by examining questions such as: 
1. What material is the government apt to require in the next five 
to ten years? 
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2. What is the current state-of-the-art within the areas of' govern-
ment interest? What are the possibilities for its advancement? 
3. What are the possibilities for profits? For growth? How tough 
is the competition? 
Assuming the individual firm is able to find the proper answers to these 
questions, it presumably has assured itself a position within the defense pro-
1 gram for some years to come. 
On the other hand, there are many defense contractors who will wish to, 
or be forced to, turn away from defense contracting. As pointed out earlier, 
the majority of the defense budget will be absorbed by a relatively few major 
contractors. Shifts in defense spending have widespread repercussions. For 
example, McDonald Aircraft's employment increased by more than 4, 400 since 
mid-1963 due to two projects -- the Gemini space capsule and the F4 Phantom 
fighter plane. Douglas Aircraft's employment is up 4, 200 from a year ago 
due to increased workloads for the Saturn program. On the other hand, em-
ployment dropped by a net total of about 34, 000 people at four industry giants: 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Boeing Co., Martin Co., and Aerojet-General 
Corp. Some companies cited the effect of Secretary McNamara's cost reduction 
effort; others were the victims of a shift in the type of weapons being procured 
2 by the Defense Department. 
In the past year, a total of 20, 600 persons were dropped from the pay-
rolls of Northrop Corp., Hughes Aircraft Co., Republic Aviation Corp. and 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation. In an effort to reassure the defense industry, the 
Defense Department is sending a select team of Pentagon briefers into all the 
1Richard M. Hurst, "The Demands of National Defense Upon Planning 
Within Industry', Financial Executive, August, 1964, p. 16. 
2
"Aerospace Employment Dips in Past Years", Aviation Week, 
June 29, 1964, p. 20. 
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major defense-producing centers at the present time. Their mission is to 
provide a list of the goods and services -the hardware and the R&D programs -
that are tentatively included in DOD's five-year defense plan ( 1965- 1969). 
Executives in the major industrial centers are also being lectured on the 
prospects, such as they are, of arms control and the economic consequences 
of progressive disarmament. Finally, an important part of the government's 
agenda is devoted to outlining for the defense producers how their extraordinary 
flair for systems management and their capital and intellectual resources in 
the higher technologies might best be regroup;rl for opening up whole new kinds 
of markets -urban transit, oceanography, the invention of spectacular new 
materials and processes. 3 
While all this should make the defense industry much better informed, 
it will not allay its anxiety. Secretary McNamara plans to spend $51.2 billion 
in fiscal 1965, only 2 percent off the peak spending figure of $52.3 billion in 
fiscal 1964. 4 The catch in these figures, so far as the defense industry is 
directly concerned, is that by far the biggest fraction of the military budget, 
about three-fifths of the total. is spent on general support elements, i.e., pay, 
construction, civil defense. and other items of upkeep that provide relatively 
little business for the defense industry. The defense contractors make their 
liVing from the two categories that constitute the remaining two-fifths of the 
budget- the procurement of hardware and weapon systems on the one side, 
and research and development in their diverse forms on the other. 5 
A defense-space industry analysis was conducted recently by Arthur 
D. Little, Inc. The analysis was reported by Thomas G. Miller, Jr., of the 
3 Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Defense Industry is Facing Trouble", 
Fortune, August, 1964, p. 140. 
4
see Figure 5, p. 65. 
5 Murphy, op. cit., p. 141. 
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management consultant firm's technical staff; it urged the industry to meet 
an overall market decline of 15 - 30 per cent in the next five years by seeking 
the more readily available research and development dollar rather than: the 
big production package. The report urged defense contractors to investigate 
conversions to non-aerospace markets. 
1. Disposition of Technical Talent 
An essential attribute of any company in the defense business, if it 
qualified as a manager of prime systems, has been a truly great versatility 
in many scientific disciplines and engineering skills. Without these skills, a 
company could not live, let alone attempt to work. In the present situation, 
with few major systems moving to the hardware phase and competition becoming 
more intense. many companies will face .a problem -how to hold a fine engineer-
ing staff together. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Arthur W. Barber 
suggested that contractors could benefit from application of their defense 
technologies to areas such as: urban mass transit systems, improved air 
and space travel, improved communications, weather forecasting and more 
reliable air and highway traffic control systems. 6 Other areas mentioned 
in this regard are: mining the ocean floor, sea farming, revitalizing the 
merchant marine, air and water pollutim control, urban renewal. educational 
aids. and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. 
Significantly. most authorities suggest that defense contractors, rather 
than make consumer products, turn instead to government-backed enterprises, 
or to products and services sold to other industries to compensate for de-
creased military sales. 
Industry, notably the aerospace people, has already taken some steps 
toward moving into a closer liaison with state governments and away from the 
6 
"Where Can Defense Contractor's Turn?", Business Week, July 18, 
1964, p. 55. 
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Federal apparatus. Only the barest vestiges of the changeover show yet, 
mostly in California where the state has just begun committing tax receipts 
toward a cooperative effort with aerospace concerns to solve earthbound 
problems. The first of the research contracts whereby California aerospace 
companies hope to bolster their sagging R&D budgets has already been signed. 
It calls for the Aerojet-General Corporation, which has done work on rocket 
engines and space systems, to assign professional specialists to develop long-
range state plans to manage all kinds of waste, including air and water pollu-
t . 7 lOU, 
State officials are under no illusions that California without Federal 
aid could finance at a cost of billions some of the prospective solutions to its 
problems. But they hope that, at a total cost not exceeding $400, 000 for six 
months' work, ideas for solutions can be obtained and a major presentation can 
be made to the Federal Government. The assumption is that a leveling off of 
defense expenditures will be accompanied by the diversion of some defense 
funds to other public needs. 
In addition, Northrop Corporation is venturing into an early-warning 
system for mental illness, while Lockheed has signed a contract to study the 
State information system. On the east coast, Sperry Rand Corporation, one 
of the top twenty-five defense contractors, has a $5.3 million contract with the 
City of New York to install the first stage of a citywide traffic control system. 
Total value of the traffic control work for the entire city will probably range 
up to $20 million. 
It all presents fascinating possibilities in helping to solve the problem 
of large pools of unused technical talent. According to estimates offered by 
7 Lawrence E. Davies, "California Hires Aerospace Skills", The New 
York Times, January 10, 1965, p. 49. 
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California Governor Edmund G. Brown, about half of all engineers and 
scientists trained in space research and development live and work in Cali-
fornia. All of them are vulnerable to cutbacks and phase-outs in the govern-
ment's space and defense programs. This is the main reason for the State 1 s 
leadership in the conversion to non-defense work. 8 
2. Final Comment 
The most fundamental problem of the defense contractor is the in-
security of his market position. As Chapter IV. H. points out, the rapidly 
changing requirements of the Department of Defense force firms to shift their 
product lines rapidly. 
In the light of the "leveling off" of defense spending, individual firms 
must make the decision to strive for the defense dollar, to diversify and 
enter into non-defense markets, or to choose a position somewhere between 
the first two. The task of predicting in advance which efforts will lead to a 
payoff is difficult. The defense contractors must concentrate talents in areas 
which appear most likely to pay off, but plan with sufficient flexibility to alter 
course rapidly. There is always the possibility of a profitabl~ "commercial 
spin-off'' from a funded government program. A company's objectives and 
plans should consider these possibilities. The defense contractors are in a 
position to provide a valuable source of experience, and ideas for business in 
general, to the commercial sector of the economy. 
APPENDIX A 
ARMED S~RVICES PROCUREMENT ACT EXCEPTIONS 
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 sets forth 17 exceptions 
to the requirement for procurement by formal advertising. These exceptions 
include many of those allowed under the Revised Statue 3709 and others which 
were found from war-time experience to be necessary for successful procure-
ment. 
The exceptions are as follows: 
(1) When determined to be necessary in the public interest during 
periods of national emergency. 
(2) When the public exigency will not permit delay incident to ad-
vertising. 
(3) When the aggregate amount involved does not exceed $1, 000. 
(4) For personal or professional services. 
(5) For any services rendered by an educational institution. 
(6) When supplies and services are to be procured for use outside 
the United States. 
(7) For medical supplies. 
(8) For supplies purchased for authorized resale. 
(9) For perishable supplies. 
(10) For supplies or services for which it is impractical to secure 
competition. 
(11) When the agency head determines that the purchase is for experi-
mental, developmental or research work or for the manufacture 
of supplies for experimentation, development, research or testing. 
(12) For security reasons. 
(13) For technical equipment necessary in order to insure standardization 
and interchangeability of parts necessary in the public interest. 
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(14) For technical or specialized supplies requiring substantial initial 
investment or an extended period of preparation for manufacture 
when competitive bidding might require duplication of investment 
or preparation already made or would unduly delay procurement. 
(15) When the bid prices received as a result of advertising are un-
reasonable or have not been independently arrived at in open 
competition. 
(16) To make or keep available a supplier in the interest of national 
defense. 
(17) As otherwise authorized by law. 
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